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Studies abound investigating whether agency or stewardship theory is more applicable 
within family firms. Both theories predict enhanced firm performance, but starkly contrast in 
behavioral assumptions and structural prescriptions. Agency theory assumes an economic model 
of man; agent behavior is based on self-interest and may conflict with the principal’s interest. 
Governance structures that control and monitor agents are prescribed to thwart opportunistic 
behavior and better align the goals of the principal and agent. Stewardship theory assumes a 
humanistic model of man; steward behavior is based on serving others and therefore will align 
with the principal’s interest. Governance structures that empower stewards are prescribed to 
facilitate the continued alignment of interests. Investigations reveal that either theory can be 
applicable in the unique context of family firms, thereby creating ambiguous and confounding 
predictions about behavior and performance.  
I address this theoretical and empirical debate by reviewing and synthesizing the family 
firm literature grounded in these theories. I then conduct an empirical study to narrow the 
distance between these opposing theoretical perspectives. My research investigates the 
integration of agency and stewardship theories on family firm behavior and performance. My 
research model intertwines components of agency and stewardship perspectives, making 
predictions within, across, and in the integration of theories. Primary data collected from family 
firm leaders, family employees, and nonfamily employees were analyzed in matched triads 
representing 77 family firms. Results support the majority of predictions made. Contributions to 
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CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
 
“Agency theory offers a rich and fruitful frame of reference by which the peculiar problems of family businesses 
might be studied.”  
- Chrisman, Chua, and Litz, 2004: 351 
 
“Stewardship theory is ideal for explaining governance in the family business context.”  
- Davis, Allen, and Hayes, 2010: 1093 
 
“Agency and stewardship issues might operate side by side in some family firms. Further research is needed to 
explore this possibility.”  
- Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, and Chang, 2007: 1037 
 
Introduction of Context and Theory 
Family firms are the most prevalent type of organization around the globe (Debicki, 
Matherne, Kellermanns, and Chrisman, 2009). In the US alone, family firms may account for as 
much as 90% of all businesses (Anderson and Reeb, 2004) and account for 40 to 60% of the 
gross national product (Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003b). World-wide, more than two out of 
every three businesses are family owned or controlled (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006; 
Westhead and Howorth, 2006). Family firms have also been characterized as the longest-lived 
organizational type, with some dating back to as early as the sixth century (Astrachan, 2010).  
Although family firms dominate the global landscape, research considering the family 
firm as a unique organizational type has been practically non-existent until recently (Barnett and 
Kellermanns, 2006; Goel, Mazzola, Phan, Pieper, and Zachary, 2012; Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller, 2009). The prevalence and endurance of family firms has recently captured the attention 
of organizational scholars, spawning a dramatic increase in research centering on this important 
topic. Within the last decade, there has been a surge of family firm articles in both mainstream 
and specialized journals and the emergence of academies, conferences, and new journals focused 
on these types of organizations (Astrachan, 2010; Debicki et al., 2009). Main topics of scholarly 




governance, altruism, familiness, and more recently, stewardship theory and the pursuit of 
noneconomic goals (Chrisman, Kellermanns, Chan, and Liano, 2010). 
Until such a time when these varied research efforts result in a dominant paradigm for the 
field, scholars borrow traditional organizational theories, such as the opposing agency and 
stewardship theories, to determine their generalizability to the family firm context. Agency 
theory has been an influential and dominant perspective in the study of management for decades 
(Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, and Becerra, 2010; Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997; Nyberg, 
Fulmer, Gerhart, and Carpenter, 2010). Broadly, agency theory is about the relationship between 
two parties, the principal and the agent-manager (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Specifically, it addresses this relationship from a behavioral and a structural perspective. Rooted 
in economics, agency theory suggests that agents will choose opportunistic self-interested 
behavior rather than behavior aimed at maximizing the principal’s interest (Davis et al., 1997; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As such, principals will enact structural or 
governance mechanisms to monitor the agent’s behavior, intending to thwart behavior not 
aligned with the interest of the principal (Cruz et al., 2010; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In turn, behavior will align and the performance of the firm 
will increase (Fama, 1980).  
In more recent years, stewardship theory has emerged as an alternate perspective in 
organizational research (Braun and Sharma, 2007; Pieper, 2010). Stewardship theory is about the 
relationship between two parties, the principal and the steward-manager (Davis et al., 1997). 
Specifically, it also addresses this relationship from a behavioral and a structural perspective. 
Because of its roots in sociology and psychology, stewardship theory describes a more 




and Salvato, 2004; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). It portrays individuals as stewards, intrinsically 
motivated to put the interests of the principal ahead of self-serving interests (Corbetta and 
Salvato, 2004; Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, and Craig, 2008). Behavior is seen as 
collectivistic and cooperative, and therefore pro-organizational (Davis et al., 1997; Eddleston, 
Kellermanns, and Zellweger, 2012). To facilitate and encourage stewardship and thus increased 
performance, principals create an organizational structure conducive to this behavior (Cruz et al., 
2010; Davis et al., 1997).  
As described, both theories predict enhanced firm performance, but starkly contrast in 
behavioral assumptions and structural prescriptions (Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, and Chang, 
2007; Cruz et al., 2010; Wasserman, 2006; Tosi, Brownlee, Silva, and Katz, 2003). This has 
created an on-going debate in family firm literature regarding the applicability of agency versus 
stewardship theory in this unique context (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009). Some scholars 
suggest that “agency theory offers a rich and fruitful frame of reference by which the peculiar 
problems of family businesses might be studied” (Chrisman, Chua, and Litz, 2004: 351), while 
others describe stewardship theory as “ideal for explaining governance in the family business 
context” (Davis, Allen, and Hayes, 2010: 1093). Solid arguments have been made and supported 
in the family firm literature on both sides of the debate, thereby creating ambiguous and 
confounding predictions about family firm behavior and performance. 
Research Objective 
Agency theory has received considerable research attention since its migration into the 
family firm literature, and more recently, stewardship theory has followed suit (Le Breton-Miller 
and Miller, 2009). Knowledge can be gained by this migration, such as new insights regarding 




competitive advantage of family firms. Accordingly, the first objective of my dissertation 
research is to review, synthesize, and expose limitations in the literature grounded to agency 
theory and/or stewardship theory within family firms. Through this process, the aim is to gain 
insights into the appropriateness and predictive ability of each theory on family firm behavior 
and performance. The second objective of my dissertation research is to empirically investigate 
predictions developed from insights gleaned from the review and synthesis.  
Research Questions 
My dissertation research investigates the agency versus stewardship theory debate within 
a family firm context. Through both an exhaustive review and synthesis of the family firm 
literature and an empirical test using primary data gathered from family firm leaders, family 
employees, and nonfamily employees, I address the following research questions: 
1. Are the tenets, prescriptions, and related performance outcomes of (a) agency theory 
and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family firms? 
 
2. Can the opposing prescriptions of agency theory and stewardship theory be integrated 
within family firms to explain firm performance? 
 
3. Does the family firm context (a) expand and/or (b) impose boundary conditions on 
agency and stewardship theories?  
 
Contributions 
This dissertation research makes contributions to family firm literature, theory, and 
practice. For family firm literature, it answers a call for examinations of agency and stewardship 
theories side by side in the context of family firms (Chrisman et al., 2007). Specifically, this 
research considers agency governance structures in tandem with stewardship governance 
structures. In doing so, it begins to fill the gap in the family firm literature stream regarding the 
value (or destructiveness) of these governance structures on performance. Although the focus is 




governance structures and firm performance. Behavior is an important but neglected element of 
both agency and stewardship theories, and is therefore captured in this research. Because of the 
additional focus on individual behavior, this research can consider both family and nonfamily 
employees of the family business, arguing that the relationships may vary by kinship status 
(Davis et al., 2010). This implies that respondents are a key concern in family firm research; 
results may be misleading if studies continue to mix survey responses from family and nonfamily 
employees (Madison and Kellermanns, 2013). Additionally, this research makes an empirical 
contribution to the family firm literature. To my knowledge, it is the first study to capture and 
analyze data from matched triads comprised of the leader, a family employee, and a nonfamily 
employee of the family firm.  
For theory, this research provides a theoretical integration, suggests an important 
boundary condition, and provides a foundation for a theoretical extension. This integrated study 
is the first to capture the essence of both theories in tandem. Agency and stewardship theories 
address the principal-manager relationship from a structural, behavioral, and performance 
outcome perspective (Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, I incorporate both 
agency and stewardship structure and behavior in the same research model. I empirically capture 
the choice of agency and stewardship structure and behavior by obtaining and analyzing survey 
responses from both sides of the principal-manager relationship. Because of this integrated 
approach, performance outcomes predicted within each theory and across theories can be 
empirically investigated. Second, this research imposes a boundary condition around the 
proposed behavioral and performance outcomes of theory when context is taken into 
consideration. It empirically investigates whether outcomes of agency and stewardship 




Third, this research offers an extension to agency and stewardship theories. The original theories 
neglect to consider how the leader of the organization can influence the behavioral choice of 
managers. This study empirically investigates whether the leader can choose and implement 
governance structures that can influence the manager’s choice of agent or steward behavior. This 
extension provides a new area of investigation for agency and stewardship research, particularly 
as it relates to leaders influencing matched behavioral choices to obtain the desired performance 
outcomes.  
For practice, my research sheds light on the ambiguity surrounding the value of 
governance structures for family firms. Ultimately, firm performance can be affected by both 
agency and stewardship governance structures and by their varying behavioral effects on family 
and nonfamily employees of the business. Accordingly, family firm leaders need to pay 
particular attention when implementing these structures. Achieving optimal firm performance is 
a balancing act between implementing the appropriate levels and types of governance structures 
and receiving the desired behavioral outcomes from both family and nonfamily employees.  
Organization of Dissertation 
My dissertation contains five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical focus (i.e., 
agency theory and stewardship theory) and the unique context (i.e., family firms). It contains a 
statement of purpose, the questions that guide this research, and the intended contributions. 
Chapter 2 is divided into three sections. The first section provides a broad overview of agency 
theory and stewardship theory. The second section considers these theories in context by 
examining the family firm literature grounded in agency and/or stewardship theories; it 
highlights commonalities, reveals limitations, and provides recommendations for future research. 




agency and stewardship perspectives in family firms to predict firm performance. Chapter 3 
outlines the methodology, including the survey instrument and approach, sample, measures, and 
data analytics. Chapter 4 reports the results of the analysis. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation 
with a discussion of the results and an overall assessment regarding the appropriateness, 
boundary conditions, and future research opportunities pertaining to the use of these theories 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This chapter provides a review of the literature in three major sections. The first section 
provides a general overview of agency theory and stewardship theory and a more specific 
comparison of the characteristics of each. The second section provides a review and synthesis of 
the family firm literature grounded in agency and/or stewardship theories and calls attention to 
gaps in the literature. Building from the review and seeking to address the gaps, the final section 
presents a research model and development of hypotheses integrating agency and stewardship 
theories in context to predict family firm performance. 
Theory 
Every theory should contain three necessary elements; namely the what, how, and why 
(Whetten, 1989). The what seeks to describe the phenomenon and the associated factors in a 
comprehensive but parsimonious way, the how describes the relationship between the factors, 
and the why explains the rationale underlying the selected factors and their proposed 
relationships (Reay and Whetten, 2011; Whetten, 1989). Theories should also be generalizable, 
but instead often suffer from boundary conditions and limitations when context, like the where, 
is taken into consideration (Lee and O’Neill, 2003; Smith and Hitt, 2005; Whetten, 1989). 
Context refers to “situational opportunities and constraints that affect the occurrence and 
meaning of organizational behavior as well as functional relationships between variables” 
(Johns, 2006: 386).  
My dissertation research considers both theory and context. The overview of agency 
theory and stewardship theory
1
 is organized by the theoretical elements of what, how, and why. 
Following the overview, I transition to the element of where by examining both agency and 
                                                 
1
 The overview of agency theory and stewardship theory intends to summarize key theoretical elements rather than 
to provide a review of the general literature applying these theories. The review of the literature is instead specific to 




stewardship theories specifically within family firm research to assess their strength and 
generalizability with contextual considerations. I refer to the family firm context as the unique 
opportunities, challenges, and resulting behavior and performance implications arising from 
residing at the intersection of the family system and the business system. 
Agency Theory 
What. Agency theory is one of the most widely used theories in management (Arthurs 
and Busenitz, 2003; Daily, Dalton and Rajagopalan, 2003; Wasserman, 2006). Broadly, agency 
theory is about the relationship between two parties, the principal (owner) and the agent 
(manager; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). More specifically, it 
examines this relationship from a behavioral and a structural perspective. Theory suggests that 
given the chance, agents will behave in a self-interested manner, behavior that may conflict with 
the principal’s interest (Chrisman et al., 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez, and Gómez-Mejía, 2012). As such, principals will enact structural 
mechanisms that monitor the agent in order to curb the opportunistic behavior and better align 
the parties’ interests (Cruz et al., 2010; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 How. Firm performance by way of cost minimization and greater efficiencies is the 
desired outcome of the agency theory perspective (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Fama, 1980). 
When the ownership and management of a firm are separated, theory suggests that agency 
problems are created, and agency costs are incurred to alleviate these problems (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Karra, Tracey, and Phillips, 2006; Lee and O’Neill, 2003; 
Wasserman, 2006). To elaborate, separation of ownership and management is a key component 
of agency theory; the principal authorizes or delegates work to the agent, and the agent is 




agency problem is created when the interest of the principal and agent are misaligned and the 
principal lacks the information to accurately assess the behavior of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Karra et al., 2006; Lee and O’Neill, 2003; Ross, 1973). Agency problems can take the form of 
moral hazard or adverse selection (Chrisman et al., 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989; Karra et al., 2006). 
Moral hazard refers to the situation where the agent lacks effort in the scope of the employment 
relationship (Chrisman et al., 2004; Ross, 1973). It is considered a form of opportunistic 
behavior that includes free-riding, shirking, and perk-consumption (Chrisman et al., 2004; Chua 
et al., 2009; Karra et al., 2006). Adverse selection refers to the situation where the agent lacks the 
ability and skills to competently behave in the scope of the employment relationship (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Fama, 1980; Schulze et al., 2001). 
 Theory suggests the principal has two options for reducing agency problems (Eisenhardt, 
1989), both of which can curb the agent’s opportunistic behavior. The first is to create a 
governance structure that enables the monitoring and assessment of the actual behavior of the 
agent (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chrisman et al., 2007). This structure includes for example, 
reporting procedures, additional management, or a board of directors (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991). The second is to create a governance structure where the contract is based on the actual 
outcome of the agent’s behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). An example of this type of structural 
mechanism is compensation incentive pay (Chrisman et al., 2007), where pay is provided as an 
incentive for high performance. Risk is thus shifted to the agent, creating the motivation for the 
agent’s behavior to align with the principal’s interest (Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989). In 
essence, the principal makes a choice between establishing governance structures based on the 




creates agency costs, the costs borne by the principal to monitor and assess agent behavior 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 Why. The underlying assumption of agency theory is based on the economic model of 
man (Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This model assumes that 
individuals will seek to optimize their own utility. In the principal-agent relationship, an agent is 
hired to maximize the principal’s utility (Ross, 1973). However, agency theory assumes agents 
will instead behave opportunistically because they too are self-serving. Therefore, the principal 
enacts mechanisms to minimize losses to their own utility (Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). 
Stewardship Theory 
What. Stewardship theory is also about the employment relationship between two parties, 
the principal (owner) and the steward (manager; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
It too examines this relationship from a behavioral and a structural perspective. Theory suggests 
that stewards will behave in a pro-social manner, behavior which is aimed at the interest of the 
principal and thus the organization (Davis et al., 1997; Zahra et al., 2009). This behavior is 
fostered by the quality of the relationship between the principal and steward and the environment 
and ideals of the organization (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 1997). 
How. Maximum firm performance, such as sales growth or profitability, is the desired 
outcome of a stewardship perspective (Davis et al., 1997; Tosi et al., 2003). Theory suggests this 
outcome is achieved when both the principal and the manager in the employment relationship 
select to behave as stewards (Davis et al., 1997). At the heart of stewardship theory is the 
assumption that the principal-steward relationship is based on a choice. When both parties 




impact on performance because both parties are working toward the same goal (Davis et al., 
1997; Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007). 
The choice of stewardship behavior is impacted by both psychological and situational 
factors (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 1997; Vallejo, 2009). Psychological factors 
such as intrinsic motivation, high identification, and personal power can steer the behavioral 
choice to stewardship (Davis et al., 1997; Zahra et al., 2008). Intrinsic motivation exists within 
individuals and provides satisfaction in and of itself (Ryan and Deci, 2000); it is a psychological 
attribute of stewardship theory because steward managers are motivated by intangible, higher 
order rewards (Davis et al., 1997; Lee and O’Neill, 2003). Individuals who have high levels of 
identification with their organization are more likely to choose stewardship because they feel a 
strong sense of membership with their organization (Lee and O’Neill, 2003; Vallejo, 2009; Zahra 
et al., 2008). Stewardship theory applies a personal power perspective, describing power based 
on interpersonal relationships that develop over time (Davis et al., 1997) which in turn influence 
and empower steward managers. These psychological factors facilitate the choice of stewardship, 
which ultimately have a positive impact on firm performance. 
Situational factors depict the organizational structure and include the management 
philosophy and culture (Craig and Dibrell, 2006; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 
Zahra et al., 2008). Theory suggests that involvement-oriented, collectivist, low power distance 
cultures help influence the choice of stewardship behavior (Davis et al., 1997). An involvement-
oriented management philosophy is portrayed by an environment where employees are trusted 
with challenges, opportunities, and responsibility (Davis et al., 1997; Eddleston et al., 2012; 
Vallejo, 2009). In organizations typified by collectivism, individuals put the goals of the 




displaying loyalty due to the tight-knit social framework present in the organization (Davis et al., 
1997; Nicholson, 2008). Low power distance describes an environment where equality is 
perceived between different levels of the organizational hierarchy (Davis et al., 1997). An 
organizational structure that accommodates and influences the choice of stewardship behavior 
helps facilitate maximum performance for the firm. 
Why. The underlying assumption of stewardship theory is based on the humanistic model 
of man due to its foundation in sociology and psychology (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). This 
model assumes that individuals are motivated by higher order needs fulfillment (Davis et al., 
1997). In the principal-steward relationship, a steward will put the interests of the principal ahead 
of self-serving interests (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 1997; Davis et al., 2010; Zahra 
et al., 2009). A principal will create an organizational structure where these stewardship 
behaviors can flourish. As such, a stewardship structure is seen as collectivistic and cooperative, 
resulting in positive benefits for the organization (Davis et al., 1997).  
Summary 
 The essential theoretical elements of what, how, and why (Whetten, 1989) are both 
addressed by agency and stewardship theories. As shown in Table 2.1, both theories seek to 
address the same what: agency theory and stewardship theory are based on the principal-manager 
employment relationship, and describe the behavior of the parties and the resulting structure of 
the organization. Likewise, both theories seek to address the same outcome, firm performance 
(Davis et al., 1997; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Tosi et al., 2003). However, the theories differ in the 
how and why: agency theory suggests that increased performance is the result of the principal 
implementing governance structures to curb the opportunistic behavior of the agent, based on the 




is the result of the principal encouraging a governance structure that empowers and motivates 
pro-organizational behavior of the steward, based on the assumed humanistic model of man. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of Agency and Stewardship Theoretical Elements 
 Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
What Based on the principal-manager employment 
relationship: describes the behavior of the parties 
and the resulting structural mechanisms of the 
organization 
Based on the principal-manager employment 
relationship: describes the behavior of the parties 
and the resulting structural mechanisms of the 
organization 
How Performance: principal enacts governance 
mechanisms to curb an agent’s opportunistic 
behavior 
Performance: principal creates an environment 
conducive to facilitating a steward’s pro-
organizational behavior 




Agency Theory versus Stewardship Theory 
A discussion of each theory in isolation was just provided; however, a discussion of both 
agency theory and stewardship theory in comparison is warranted as well. As described, both 
theories depict the same phenomena: the employment relationship between a principal and a 
manager and its related organizational performance outcome (Tosi et al., 2003). The major 
difference is the assumed model of man, economic versus humanistic (Corbetta and Salvato, 
2004). Accordingly, agency theory and stewardship theory starkly contrast in their depiction of 
behavior and governance structures (Wasserman, 2006). 
The behavioral differences between agency and stewardship perspectives are pronounced 
in the psychological factors of motivation and identification (Davis et al., 1997; Jaskiewicz and 




(Ryan and Deci, 2000). It is broadly categorized as either extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic 
motivation is typified as the drive for an external reward (i.e., a separable outcome). Due to the 
assumed economic model of man, agency theory is characterized by extrinsic motivation, where 
individuals are motivated by quantifiable economic gain. Intrinsic motivation exists within 
individuals and provides satisfaction in and of itself (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Due to the assumed 
humanistic model of man, stewardship theory is characterized by intrinsic motivation, where 
individuals are motivated by intangible, higher order rewards (Davis et al., 1997).  
 Identification describes the connection an individual feels with the organization (Brown, 
1969; Mael and Ashforth, 1992). High levels of identification create the desire to work toward 
the organization’s success (Bass, 1960). Agency theory depicts managers as having a low level 
of identification with the organization, thus allowing for self-serving interests to be chosen over 
the principal’s interests (Davis et al., 1997). In contrast, stewardship theory depicts managers as 
having a high level of identification with their organization that it is seen as an extension of the 
self (Davis et al., 1997). High identification empowers stewards to work toward solving 
problems and attaining organizational goals, thereby fulfilling intrinsic rewards and the interest 
of the principal (Davis et al., 1997). 
 There are also structural differences in organizations depicted by either agency or 
stewardship perspectives, as evidenced by the environment and culture. The organizational 
environment can range from control-oriented to involvement-oriented. The organizational culture 
can range from individualistic to collectivistic. Control-oriented and individualistic environments 
are depicted through agency structures, such as the monitoring and controlling activities 




1989). In contrast, involvement-oriented and collectivistic cultures highlight the stewardship 
perspective (Davis et al., 1997).  
Conclusion 
The distinction between theories is found in the behavioral assumptions and the structural 
prescriptions. From a behavioral perspective, agency theory describes behavior rooted in an 
economic model of man; agent behavior will be based on self-interest and may conflict with the 
principal’s interest. Stewardship theory describes behavior rooted in a more humanistic model of 
man; steward behavior will be based on serving others and therefore will align with the 
principal’s interest. From a structural perspective, agency theory prescribes governance 
mechanisms that control and monitor agents in order to thwart opportunistic behavior and better 
align the goals of the principal and agent. Stewardship theory instead prescribes an 
organizational environment where stewards are trusted and empowered, and where control and 
monitoring mechanisms are not needed because goals of the principal and steward are already 
aligned. Both agency and stewardship theories suggest that performance is enhanced by the 
prescriptions set forth.  
To reiterate, Figure 2.1 offers an illustration of the prescriptions and outcomes related to 
each theoretical perspective. As depicted, agency theory suggests that performance will increase 
when governance and control mechanisms are in place to monitor and curb the agent’s 
opportunistic behavior (i.e., high levels of governance mechanisms, high level of performance). 
Without these controls, it is assumed that agents will act opportunistically creating costs and 
lower levels of organizational performance (i.e., low levels of governance mechanisms, low level 
of performance). The opposite is theorized by the tenets of stewardship theory. According to 




fewer monitoring and control mechanisms; this type of governance structure empowers and 
motivates stewards to pro-organizational behavior (i.e., low levels of governance mechanisms, 
high level of performance). With controls in place, it is assumed that stewards will feel betrayed 
and motivation and pro-organizational behavior will decrease (i.e., high levels of governance 







In summary, agency and stewardship theories both contain the essential elements of 
theory. Each theory has predictive and explanatory power as shown in the descriptions of the 
what, how, and why. However, the question remains as to whether the theories are adequate and 
relevant when context is taken into consideration. In other words, are expansions necessary or 














boundary conditions or limitations apparent if the where is considered? In order to assess their 
strength and generalizability, the next section of this chapter examines agency and stewardship 
theories within family firms, an important organizational context. 
Context 
Although family firms are deemed the most prevalent and oldest organizational type, 
scholarly investigations of these businesses are considerably less common and relatively recent 
(Goel et al., 2012). With research on family firms still in the early stages, guidelines for 
researchers are imperative. Importantly, research in this realm “should describe why family 
businesses are distinct, how the uniqueness builds, and how and under what conditions this may 
lead to a competitive advantage” (Klein, Astrachan, and Smyrnios, 2005: 333). Accordingly, 
family firm governance and its related performance implications has been a topic of interest due 
to the unique structures and dynamics brought about by residing at the intersection of the family 
system and the business system (Goel et al., 2012). Since agency theory and stewardship theory 
address governance and firm performance, it is therefore not surprising that they have served as 
theoretical lenses within family firm research.  
However, agency and stewardship theories offer opposing assumptions and predictions 
for firm performance, and therefore have sparked an on-going debate in the family firm literature 
regarding their applicability. Solid arguments have been made and supported on both sides of the 
debate. Investigations reveal that either theory can be applicable in the unique context of family 
firms, thereby creating ambiguous and confounding predictions about behavior and performance. 





Characteristics of the Literature Reviewed 
Forty articles grounded in agency theory and/or stewardship theory within the context of 
family firms serve as the basis for this review. Articles were found through an electronic and 
manual search of the family firm literature using combinations of keywords such as family firm, 
family business, family enterprise plus agency theory, agency costs, or stewardship theory. 
Family firm articles citing the seminal theoretical works (e.g., Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) were also reviewed to determine 
appropriateness for inclusion. To be considered for inclusion, the theoretical underpinning for the 
conceptual or empirical model had to be agency or stewardship theory. Table 2.2 provides an 
alphabetical list and the characteristics of these forty articles. 
As shown in Table 2.2, the mix of twelve conceptual and twenty-eight empirical articles 
were published in mainstream management journals, such as Academy of Management Journal, 
Journal of Management Studies, and Journal of Management, in entrepreneurship journals, 
including Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice and Journal of Business Venturing, and in 
family firm specific outlets such as Family Business Review and Journal of Family Business 
Strategy. In the broadest sense, the literature can be grouped by the theoretical perspective 
adopted; namely, agency theory (22 articles), stewardship theory (11 articles), and the adoption 
of both theoretical lenses (7 articles).  
From an authorship perspective, seventeen of the top-25 most published family firm 
scholars authored these articles (see Debicki et al., 2009): grouped by theoretical lens, the agency 
scholars include Steier, Chua, Chrisman, Dino, Gómez-Mejía, Habbershon, Lubatkin, Sharma, 
and Schulze; stewardship scholars include Eddleston and Zahra; authors simultaneously 




the only top-25 ranked author who has work separately supporting agency theory and 





Table 2.2: Agency and Stewardship Theory Research in a Family Firm Context 
Authors Journal Article Type Theoretical Perspective 
Anderson & Reeb (2003) Journal of Finance Empirical Agency Theory  
Anderson & Reeb (2004) ASQ Empirical Agency Theory  
Block (2012) JBV Empirical Agency Theory  
Blumentritt, Keyt, & Astrachan (2007) FBR Empirical Both 
Braun & Sharma (2007) FBR Empirical Agency Theory 
Chirico, Ireland, & Sirmon (2011) ETP Conceptual Agency Theory  
Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang (2007) JBR Empirical Agency Theory 
Chrisman, Chua, & Litz (2004) ETP Empirical Agency Theory  
Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel (2009) ETP Conceptual Agency Theory  
Chua, Steier, & Chrisman (2006) ETP Conceptual Agency Theory  
Corbetta & Salvato (2004) ETP Conceptual Stewardship Theory 
Craig & Dibrell (2006) FBR Empirical Stewardship Theory 
Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, & Becerra (2010) AMJ Empirical Agency Theory 
Davis, Allen, & Hayes (2010) ETP Empirical Stewardship Theory 
Dawson (2011) JBV Empirical Agency Theory 
Dibrell & Moeller (2011) JFBS Empirical Stewardship Theory 
Eddleston (2008) ETP Conceptual Stewardship Theory 
Eddleston & Kellermanns (2007) JBV Empirical Stewardship Theory 
Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Zellweger (2012) ETP Empirical Stewardship Theory 
Habbershon (2006) ETP Conceptual  Agency Theory  
Herrero (2011) JoM Empirical Agency Theory  
Jaskiewicz & Klein (2007) JBR Empirical Both 
Karra, Tracey, & Phillips (2006) ETP Empirical Agency Theory  
Le Breton-Miller & Miller (2009) ETP Conceptual Both 
Lester & Cannella (2006) ETP Conceptual Agency Theory  
Lubatkin, Durand, & Ling (2007) JBR Conceptual Agency Theory  
Lubatkin, Ling, Schulze (2007) JMS Conceptual Agency Theory  
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick (2008) JMS Empirical Stewardship Theory 
Nicholson (2008) AMP Conceptual Agency Theory  
Pearson & Marler (2010) ETP Conceptual Stewardship Theory 
Pieper, Klein, & Jaskiewicz (2008) JSBM Empirical Both 
Prencipe, Markarian, & Pozza (2008) FBR Empirical Both 
Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino (2003a) JBV Empirical Agency Theory  
Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino (2003b) AMJ Empirical Agency Theory  
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz (2001) Org Science Empirical Agency Theory  
Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, & Pieper (2012) Small Bus Econ Empirical Both 
Tsai, Hung, Kuo, & Kuo (2006) FBR Empirical Agency Theory  
Vallejo (2009) JBE Empirical Stewardship Theory 
Westhead & Howorth (2006) FBR Empirical Both 





The theoretical lens adopted coincides with the passage of time. The articles span more 
than a decade from 2001 through 2012. Agency theory migrated into the family firm literature 
stream first, starting with the work of Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001). A few 
years later, the works of Corbetta and Salvato (2004) and Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007) 
were the first to support stewardship theory from a conceptual and empirical approach, 
respectively. Westhead and Howorth (2006) started a wave of research that adopts both agency 
























As shown, during the publication years 2001-2003, family firm articles applying an 
agency theory perspective were the only agency/stewardship-related articles in the literature; 
discussions and support for stewardship theory and both theories considered simultaneously soon 
followed. Noticeable shifts began in the period 2004-2007: agency theory research in family 
firms started its decline to a level below that of stewardship theory research; research supporting 
a stewardship perspective in family firms drastically increased; and articles supporting both 
agency and stewardship perspectives slightly increased. My review and synthesis of these 
articles are organized accordingly. 
Agency Theory Research 
Agency theory has been a prominent lens in organizational research and more specifically 
in family firm research (Chrisman et al., 2005; Goel et al., 2012; Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 
2009). Twenty-two of the forty articles included in this review adopt an agency theory 
perspective. Table 2.3 displays an alphabetical list, description, and key findings of these articles. 
After reviewing these articles, it became apparent that the articles differed by research focus. 
Each article had a research focus in one of two groups; namely, one group examines whether 
family firms are susceptible to agency problems (17 articles) and one group supports agency 
theory perspectives and prescriptions compared to that of stewardship (5 articles). Accordingly, 
the agency focus (i.e., problems or prescriptions) is shown in a column in Table 2.3, and the 
literature is reviewed by group.  
The group addressing agency problems in the context of family firms includes eight 
conceptual and nine empirical articles. The focus of the articles is on the unique characteristics 
that create agency problems in family firms, and how they affect the relationship between 




majority of empirical articles sample private family firms (i.e., 6 private using primary data; 3 
public using secondary data) in the US (i.e., 6 US, 1 Spain, 1 Turkey, 1 Taiwan).  
The group addressing agency prescriptions provides empirical support that agency theory 
is more applicable in a family firm context when compared with a stewardship perspective. Two 
articles use public firm samples and secondary data; two use private firm samples and primary 
data; the majority uses US samples, and all use regression to explore variations in performance, 
with the exception of one that considers CEO perceptions. The fifth article samples private 
equity firms and their perceptions of family firms. A synthesis of the literature within each group 





Table 2.3: Agency Theory Research in a Family Firm Context 
Authors Sample Firm Type Respondent Data Analysis IV DV Agency Focus Key Findings 
 
Anderson & Reeb 
(2003) 
 























Family firms outperform 
nonfamily firms; family 
ownership reduces 
opportunism 
Anderson & Reeb 
(2004) 
141 family & 262 
nonfamily firms 
-US- 
Public n/a -secondary 
data  






Agency prescriptions apply 
in family firms; family 
directors monitor business; 
independent directors 
monitor family 
Block (2012) 154 family firms 
-US- 
Public n/a -secondary 
data 






Family ownership creates 
agency costs; face moral 
hazard and information 
asymmetry 
Braun & Sharma 
(2007) 
84 family firms 
-US- 
Public n/a -secondary 
data 






CEO duality does not 









pursuing growth  








and management are 
beneficial for franchising; 
assumes lack of agency 
problems 
Chrisman, Chua, & 
Litz (2004) 





Regression Strategic planning 






Agency problems are 
decreased with family 
involvement 
Chrisman, Chua, 
Kellermanns, & Chang 
(2007) 










Family managers are 
agents; agency 
prescriptions increase firm 
performance 






   Compensation and 
Performance 
Evaluation Systems 




Altruism can be costly to 
family firms; lower 
motivation and increased 




Table 2.3. Continued. 
Authors Sample Firm Type Respondent Data Analysis IV DV Agency Focus Key Findings 
 













The agency costs of family 
firms can be offset by 
social capital 
Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, & 
Becerra (2010) 
122 family firms 
-US- 
Public Principal  
(CEO) 
Regression Family relations 
Family ownership 
Pay 




CEO perceptions and trust 
impact agency contracts 
and implementation of 
agency prescriptions 











Investors associate family 
and business negatively; 
prefer to invest in 
professional family firms  
Karra, Tracey, & 
Phillips (2006) 








Agency costs Agency Problem 
-Altruism 
Family influence decreases 
and increases agency 
problems depending on the 
business stage 






Extends Karra et al (2006); 
governance systems must 
match life cycle 











Efficiency Agency Problem 
-Family relations 
Family firms outperform 
nonfamily firms; have 
reduced agency problems 




Public   Firm type 
(family/nonfamily) 
Performance Agency Problem 
- Organizational 
structure 
Family firm agency costs 
can be reduced with board 
interlocks 
Lubatkin, Durand, & 
Ling (2007) 
-conceptual-    Altruism Agency costs Agency Problem 
-Altruism 
Altruism explains 
variances in governance 





Table 2.3. Continued. 





















Nicholson (2008) -conceptual-    Leadership 
Good governance 
Survival Agency Problem 
-Family passions 
Family firms suffer from 
agency problems; they can 
survive with good 
governance and leadership 
Schulze, Lubatkin, & 
Dino (2003a) 
883 family firms 
-US- 
Private Principal  
(CEO) 




Family firms have unique 
agency problems; created 
by altruism 
Schulze, Lubatkin, & 
Dino (2003b) 





power of board 
Debt Agency Problem 
-Altruism 




Dino, & Buchholtz 
(2001) 
1376 family firms 
-US- 
Private Principal  
(CEO) 







Altruism creates agency 
problems; family firms 
must incur agency costs 
Tsai, Hung, Kuo, & 
Kuo (2006) 












CEO tenure Agency Problem 
-n/a 
Family firms need to refine 
governance systems; 
agency theory is not 




Agency Problems. At the heart of agency theory is the separation of ownership and 
management and the problems that arise from this separation (Eisenhardt, 1989). This owner-
manager conflict is referred to as a Type I agency problem (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
However, it was assumed that family firms are not susceptible to Type I agency problems due to 
a lack of separation among owners and managers (Chrisman et al., 2004; Goel et al., 2012; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976); and therefore, agency perspectives remained absent in this 
organizational context. However, the work of Schulze and his colleagues challenged this logic 
(Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003a, 2003b), and thus began an important 
stream of literature. This stream seeks to conceptually and empirically demonstrate that family 
firms are indeed susceptible to agency problems and costs due to their unique aspects. Research 
supports nontraditional agency problems that are specific to the family firm context, created for 
example by asymmetric altruism (Moores, 2009; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003) and entrenched 
family ownership (Block, 2012; Moores, 2009; Nicholson, 2008). 
Altruism is often regarded as selfless behavior that benefits others, but is presented in a 
much different light by agency theorists (Eddleston, Kellermanns, and Sarathy, 2008). Agency 
theory perspectives refer to altruism as asymmetric, which describes behavior that is exploitable, 
not reciprocal, and can cause harm to family firms (Chua et al., 2009; Wright and Kellermanns, 
2011). Asymmetric altruism can create both moral hazard and adverse selection agency problems 
within the context of family firms (Schulze et al., 2001, 2003a). Family firms are embedded in 
family relationships, such as the parent-child relationship (Schulze et al., 2003a). Scholars 
suggest that parents can be overly generous to their children, and that their children may take 
advantage of this generosity by shirking or free-riding (Dawson, 2011; Eddleston et al., 2008; 




propensity in family firms for family leaders to refrain from monitoring other family members’ 
behavior (Chua, Chrisman, Kellermanns, and Wu, 2011; Eddleston, Chrisman, Steier, and Chua, 
2010). Asymmetric altruism can also create adverse selection agency problems when family 
firms hire family members instead of nonfamily regardless of whether they are the most qualified 
or skilled for the position (Karra et al., 2006; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003a), and may even pay 
them more generously (Chua et al., 2009). These asymmetric altruism-created agency problems 
result in decreased family firm performance (Eddleston et al., 2010; Wright and Kellermanns, 
2011), or create the necessity for family firms to incur agency costs by implementing governance 
mechanisms to monitor and assess behavior (Chua et al., 2009; Lubatkin, Durand, and Ling, 
2007).  
Entrenched family ownership can also create agency problems specific to family firms. 
Entrenchment is defined as “the relational contract between owners and managers that enable 
both to occupy key positions in the firm for a significant duration” (Moores, 2009: 172). Family 
ownership is often described as an effective organizational structure because it reduces Type I 
agency problems associated with the separation of owners and managers (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Chirico, Ireland, and Sirmon, 2011; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Tsai et al., 2006); 
however, there is evidence that suggests otherwise (Block, 2012; Nicholson, 2008). Block (2012) 
contends that family firm ownership is not a superior corporate governance structure because 
family dynamics and conflicts are difficult to monitor. Ineffective monitoring allows for the 
potential for increased moral hazard problems, and is empirically shown to be associated with 
lower productivity (Block, 2012). Nicholson (2008) suggests family ownership can facilitate 
agency problems such as the inability to make sound business decisions due to an excessive 




business. Accordingly, governance mechanisms are necessary to alleviate these family firm 
specific agency problems in order for the business to thrive (Block, 2012; Nicholson, 2008). 
Additionally, family ownership can create a second type of agency problem specific to 
family firms, referred to as a Type II agency problem (Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan, 2007; Goel 
et al., 2012; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Instead of the Type I owner-manager conflict, the Type 
II represents the conflict between majority and minority shareholders (i.e., family and nonfamily 
shareholders; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). An example of a Type II agency problem manifests 
itself in the misalignment of shareholder goals; family firms often pursue noneconomic goals at 
the expense of financial gain (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, and Moyano-
Fuentes, 2007). Diverting resources to pursue the family’s noneconomic agendas may negatively 
impact firm performance (Chrisman et al., 2004), thus creating conflict between family and 
nonfamily shareholders.  
In conclusion, this group of agency theory literature provides support that agency 
problems are indeed prevalent in the family firm context. This agency problem research is 
important for two reasons. First, this literature challenged original agency theory research that 
argued agency problems did not exist in organizations typified by the convergence of ownership 
and management (i.e., Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In 
doing so, a host of nontraditional agency problems specific to family firms (i.e., asymmetric 
altruism, family entrenchment, Type II agency problems) were brought to light, thus expanding 
agency theory into the realm of the family firm. Second, this realization allows for continued 
agency research within a family firm context, but with a different focus. It allows scholars to 




next group of articles I reviewed shifts the focus away from agency problems, and instead 
focuses on agency prescriptions
2
.  
Agency Prescriptions. Five articles in my review support agency theory’s applicability 
within family firms by examining outcomes of agency prescriptions. Three of these articles are 
similar with their focus on firm performance (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Braun and Sharma, 
2007; Chrisman et al., 2007), the remaining two offer unique perceptual perspectives (e.g., Cruz, 
Gómez-Mejía, and Becerra, 2010; Dawson, 2011). A summary of agency prescriptions 
impacting firm performance and perception outcomes is provided next. 
The three articles examining firm performance focus their attention on boards of directors 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Braun and Sharma, 2007), incentive compensation (Chrisman et al., 
2007), and monitoring activities (Chrisman et al., 2007) as agency prescriptions to mitigate 
agency problems within family firms. Anderson and Reeb (2004) examine board independence 
and family influence to support their contention that an agency lens is applicable to family firms. 
They conclude that monitoring mechanisms such as a board of directors are necessary; outside 
board members are put in place to monitor the family, and family members have a place on the 
board to monitor the business (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Likewise, Chrisman and his 
colleagues (2007) explore the motivations and control of family firm managers to determine if 
they are agents or stewards. They conclude that family managers are agents because family firms 
using governance mechanisms prescribed by agency theory (i.e., monitoring, incentive 
compensation) have higher levels of performance (Chrisman et al., 2007). Braun and Sharma 
                                                 
2
 Some articles examine both agency problems and agency prescriptions. I interpreted the primary focus and 
grouped each article accordingly. One factor that attributed to my grouping decision was the theoretical grounding: 
all agency problem articles used agency theory only; all agency prescription articles pitted agency theory with 




(2007) explore CEO duality and demonstrate that the separation of positions is a beneficial 
governance structure for family firm performance. 
Instead of a focus on performance, the remaining two articles in this agency prescription 
group are focused on perceptions. Cruz and her colleagues (2010) examine how agency contracts 
are affected by the CEO’s perceptions of the top management team. In line with agency theory, 
they suggest that monitoring and incentive mechanisms are implemented based on the CEO’s 
trust perceptions of top managers. In the family firm context, they suggest that the presence of 
top managers who are related to the CEO and the level of family ownership in the firm affect 
these perceptions. Dawson (2011) examines the perceptions of private equity firms as they assess 
the attractiveness of family firms. She finds that investors prefer professionalized family firms, 
described as businesses that have agency prescriptions in place, such as human resources 
practices and the presence of nonfamily managers (Dawson, 2011). 
In conclusion, this group of family firm articles focuses on the remedies prescribed by 
agency theory that are theorized to positively impact firm performance. Importantly, this 
research provides support that agency prescriptions, such as the presence of a board of directors, 
incentive compensation plans, and monitoring activities serve their intended and theorized 
purpose within family firms. Similar to agency problem research, this research expands the 
boundary conditions of agency theory by supporting its prescriptions and related outcomes 
within a new organizational context, a context once thought to be irrelevant to agency theory. 
Limitations and Future Research. Although agency theory problems and prescriptions are 
prevalent in a family firm context, more research is still warranted. My review and synthesis 
sheds light on three limitations that can guide future investigations. The first limitation in the 




within family firms. Governance mechanisms are the dominant agency theory prescription and 
can be categorized as formal (i.e., monitoring activities, human resource policies) or social (i.e., 
informal meetings, get-togethers; Mustakallio, Aution, and Zahra, 2002). The family firm 
literature is heavily focused on formal governance mechanisms like boards of directors (e.g., 
Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Braun and Sharma, 2007), incentive compensation plans (e.g., 
Chrisman et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2001), strategic planning (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2004), or 
human resources practices (Dawson, 2011). Importantly, agency research is “concerned with 
describing the governance mechanisms that solve the agency problem” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59); 
however, research neglects to consider the impact of social governance mechanisms, and thus 
should be a consideration for future research.  
The second limitation in the agency theory literature ironically relates to the focus on 
firm level performance. The theorized outcome of agency theory is firm performance, which is 
often supported in the family firm literature (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chrisman et al., 
2007; Braun and Sharma, 2007). However, studies tend to ignore the reasons why there is a link 
between the governance structure and firm performance. Agency theory prescribes governance 
mechanisms to curb opportunistic behavior thus resulting in increased performance (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, just because governance mechanisms are in place 
and performance levels are high, doesn’t necessarily mean opportunistic behavior was thwarted; 
there could be other factors contributing to high levels of performance even in the presence of 
opportunistic behavior. To account for this possibility, structure, behavior, and performance must 
be considered. Extant studies neglect to consider behavior as the linking pin between structure 
and performance; therefore, it should be examined in future studies. For example, research could 




lack of opportunistic behavior (i.e., shirking, free-riding), and has been conceptually and 
empirically linked to increased firm performance (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992; Huselid, 1995).  
The third limitation revealed by my review and synthesis of the agency theory literature 
in family firms is the assumption that managers are a homogeneous group. Agency theorists 
subscribe to the idea that self-serving behavior is curbed by the use of governance mechanisms 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, it may be plausible that in a family 
firm context where managers can be family or nonfamily members, differing behaviors may 
result between the two groups (Chua et al., 2009; Davis et al., 2010). For example, altruism 
creates agency problems and the need for agency prescriptions within family firms (Schulze et 
al., 2001, 2003a), but this literature is focused solely on the relationship between family 
members (i.e., parent-child). Research is necessary that addresses the relationship between 
family and nonfamily members within family firms. Agency prescriptions may curb the assumed 
opportunistic behavior of family members, but do they have the same effect on nonfamily 
members? If not, what are the resulting performance implications for the family firm? 
Accordingly, future research is needed that addresses agency prescriptions and outcomes with 
considerations of employee type. 
Conclusion. My review of this literature suggests that agency theory is indeed applicable 
in a family firm context. The literature supports that agency problems are prevalent and uniquely 
created in family firms. Accordingly, agency costs must be incurred to mitigate these problems. 
Meaning, agency structural prescriptions, such as boards of directors, compensation incentive 
plans, and monitoring activities, are deemed necessary in family firms to curb opportunistic self-
interested agent behavior and thus reap firm level performance benefits. However, other 




altering agent behavior. Assessing actual agent behavior is also warranted; in doing so, the 
behavior of family and nonfamily employees could be assessed to determine if the prescriptions 
of agency theory hold equivocally across employee types. In conclusion, agency theory is an 
applicable theoretical perspective for family firm governance and performance research; 
however, more research is necessary to fully comprehend the impact of agency prescriptions on 
the behaviors within the family firm. 
This concludes my review and synthesis of the family firm literature adopting an agency 
theory perspective. At this time, I am able to address part (a) of my first research question. To 
reiterate, the first research question asks, ‘are the tenets, prescriptions, and related performance 
outcomes of (a) agency theory and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family firms?’ Based 
on the review and synthesis, I am able to conclude that agency theory tenets, prescriptions, and 
related performance outcomes are applicable within family firms. I now transition to my review 
and synthesis of the family firm literature adopting a stewardship theory perspective to address 
part (b) of the research question. 
Stewardship Theory Research 
Family firm research adopting a stewardship perspective has been on the rise in recent 
years (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009; Zahra et al., 2008). Since Corbetta and Salvato (2004) 
suggested stewardship theory and its humanistic model of man as an appropriate alternative to 
agency theory within the family firm context, a wave of articles adopting this theory has been 
generated. There are eleven articles adopting a stewardship perspective within family firms. 
These articles span six years, having been published in every year from 2006 through 2012. 
Eight articles are empirical investigations, all of which are survey-based research on small 




articles incorporate survey data from nonfamily firms as well. Regression is the dominant 
approach to data analysis, followed by structural equation modeling. Primarily, the dependent 
variable is a measure of firm level performance. The independent variables depict a focus on 
stewardship structure, behavior, or leadership; my review is provided according to this focus. 




Table 2.4: Stewardship Theory Research in a Family Firm Context 
Authors Sample Firm Type Respondent Data Analysis IV DV Stewardship Focus Key Findings 
Corbetta & Salvato 
(2004) 
-conceptual-      Leadership Stewardship may apply in 
family firms; family owner 
shapes the model of man 













Structure Stewardship characterizes 
family firms; it drives 
strategy and performance 
Davis, Allen, & Hayes 
(2010) 















Behavior Stewardship is ‘secret 
sauce’ for family firms; 
family perceive leaders as 
stewards, nonfamily 
perceive leaders as agents 
Dibrell & Moeller 
(2011) 










Innovativeness Structure Family businesses exhibit 
stewardship cultures that 
help increase 
innovativeness 
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Structure Stewardship culture 
enhances corporate 
entrepreneurship for family 
firms 
Miller, Le Breton-
Miller, & Scholnick 
(2008) 











Structure Family firms demonstrate 







Table 2.4. Continued. 
Authors Sample Firm Type Respondent Data Analysis IV DV Stewardship Focus Key Findings 
Pearson & Marler 
(2010) 




Leadership Family firm leaders can 
create a culture of 
reciprocal stewardship for 
family and nonfamily 

















Neubaum, Dibrell, & 
Craig (2008) 















 Structure. Structural or situational stewardship factors depict the work environment and 
culture of the organization (Davis et al., 1997). Theory suggests these stewardship factors 
encourage cooperation and empower and motivate employees, thereby enabling pro-
organizational behaviors and ultimately firm performance (Davis et al., 1997; Eddleston and 
Kellermanns, 2007). Varying types of structural factors have been empirically tested within the 
family firm studies. When compared to nonfamily firms, family firms are shown to have higher 
levels of stewardship priorities, such as an organizational culture that is inclusive, flexible, and 
where employees are nurtured, trained, and given broader responsibilities (Miller et al., 2008). 
Stewardship culture, manifested in strategic decision making responsibilities and participative 
governance structures, has been linked to higher levels of corporate entrepreneurship in family 
firms (Eddleston et al., 2012). Family firms’ collectivistic stewardship culture has also been 
associated with strategic flexibility (Zahra et al., 2008), innovativeness (Craig and Dibrell, 2006; 
Dibrell and Moeller, 2011), and firm performance (Craig and Dibrell, 2006). 
 Behavior. Behavioral or psychological factors, such as intrinsic motivation and 
identification, also facilitate stewardship (Davis et al., 1997). Family firm research adopting a 
stewardship perspective includes empirical examinations of various behavioral factors. High 
employee identification with the family business is positively associated with firm profitability 
and survival (Vallejo, 2009). Davis, Allen, and Hayes (2010) demonstrate that family firms 
foster trust and commitment among employees, making stewardship the “secret sauce” for 
creating a competitive advantage in family firms. Altruistic tendencies that are other-serving, as 
opposed to the self-serving asymmetric altruism found in agency research (Corbetta and Salvato, 
2004), are shown to positively impact the growth and financial performance of family firms 




 Leadership. Stewardship theory is about the principal-manager relationship. Theory 
suggests that both parties can choose to behave as stewards of the organization, and that the 
structural factors can influence the behavioral choice (Davis et al., 1997). Family firm empirical 
research adopting a stewardship perspective tends to focus on either the structure or the behavior 
and their respective links to firm outcomes. Research neglects to consider how structure and 
behavior are impacted by the actual relationship between the parties. However, two conceptual 
articles within the family firm realm address this issue. Pearson and Marler (2010) argue that the 
leader’s stewardship choice can motivate and facilitate reciprocal stewardship behavior from the 
employee. Likewise, Eddleston (2008) suggests that transformational leadership can lead to a 
stewardship culture. These ideas capture the essence of Corbetta and Salvato’s watershed article 
that argues that “the owning family has a crucial impact in shaping the ‘model of man’ prevailing 
within the organization as either the self-serving, economically rational man postulated by 
agency theory, or the self-actualizing, collective serving man suggested by stewardship theory” 
(Corbetta and Salvato, 2004: 357). Accordingly, leadership is an important factor in the creation 
of a stewardship structure and in influencing stewardship behavior. 
Limitations and Future Research. Stewardship research in the context of family firms is 
relatively new and somewhat sparse; but encouragingly, the theoretical tenets and projected 
outcomes do receive empirical support. However, my review reveals three gaps in this literature 
stream that can be addressed in future research. First, scholars are focused on either structural or 
behavioral factors of stewardship. Although both are important factors of stewardship theory, 
research neglects examinations of both types of factors in tandem. Simultaneous consideration 
would align better with the theoretical underpinnings. It also may be interesting to determine the 




Second, studies fail to consider the choice of stewardship from both parties in the 
principal-manager relationship. Theory stresses that increased performance is based on both the 
principal and manager making a choice of stewardship (Davis et al., 1997). None of the reviewed 
literature addresses the choice either conceptually or empirically. As such, research is warranted 
that considers both sides of the relationship; conceptual models should address both the 
principal’s choice and the manager’s choice of stewardship behavior. This concept should then 
be carried through empirically by capturing data from both the principal and manager. As shown 
in Table 3, extant studies only address the perspective of the principal (e.g., Zahra et al., 2008) or 
the manager (e.g., Vallejo, 2009) as evidenced by the survey respondents. Furthermore, 
empirical studies capture and mix responses from the CEO and the top manager to reflect the 
principal’s view of stewardship (e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007); when quite possibly, 
these respondents may actually be the principal and the manager in the relationship. 
Third, more research is needed to develop the ideas surrounding the leadership factors 
that could extend stewardship theory. Research should consider the role and characteristics of the 
leader in order to better understand how stewardship behaviors are encouraged and supported. 
Structural and behavioral factors are important, but leadership seems equally important in 
encouraging the choice of stewardship on the part of the manager and ultimately impacting firm 
performance.  
Conclusion. My review of this literature suggests that stewardship theory is indeed 
applicable in a family firm context. The literature supports that stewardship structures and 
behaviors are pronounced in a family firm environment. Furthermore, the research demonstrates 
that these stewardship characteristics are predictive of family firm performance, as suggested by 




the principal-manager relationship. Meaning, the focus is on either the structure or the behavior 
and therefore does not capture the essence of stewardship theory (i.e., the choice and its 
influencing factors). Simultaneous investigations of both sides of the relationship would enable 
considerations of stewardship choice, structure, behavior, and leadership influences. In doing so, 
a more comprehensive assessment of the appropriateness of stewardship theory within a family 
firm context could be made. 
This concludes my review and synthesis of the family firm literature adopting a 
stewardship perspective. At this time, I am able to address part (b) of my first research question. 
To reiterate, the first research question asks, ‘are the tenets, prescriptions, and related 
performance outcomes of (a) agency theory and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family 
firms?’ Based on the review and synthesis, I am able to conclude that stewardship theory tenets, 
prescriptions, and related performance outcomes are applicable within family firms. I now 
transition to my review and synthesis of the family firm literature adopting both an agency and 
stewardship theory perspective to address my second research question, ‘can the opposing 
prescriptions of agency theory and stewardship theory be integrated within family firms to 
explain firm performance?’ 
Both Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory Research 
 There is a group of family firm literature that concludes that both agency theory and 
stewardship theory are an applicable perspective in this context, as opposed to one theory or the 
other. According to my review, there are seven articles in this group, one conceptual and six 
empirical studies. Like those adopting a stewardship approach, these articles were published 
from 2006 through 2012. In chronological order, five empirical articles, both qualitative and 




2009; then the remaining empirical article was published several years later in 2012. The 
dominant sample in this group of articles is private family firms in Europe. Table 2.5 displays a 




Table 2.5: Both Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory Research in a Family Firm Context 
Authors Sample Firm Type Respondent Data Analysis IV DV Focus Key Findings 
Blumentritt, Keyt, 
& Astrachan (2007) 











Leadership Both theories can explain CEO success: 
Agency = CEOs are competent 
Stewardship = CEO cultural/family fit 
Jaskiewicz & Klein 
(2007) 
351 family firms 
-Germany- 
 
Private Principal  
(Owner) 
Regression Owner-manager 




Prescriptions Both theories can explain board composition: 
Agency = low goal alignment (need larger 
boards, more outside members) 
Stewardship = high goal alignment 
Le Breton-Miller & 
Miller (2009) 




Leadership Social embeddedness explains perspectives: 
Agency = embedded in family (pursue family 
interests at expense of shareholders) 
Stewardship = embedded in business (pursue 
business interests) 
Pieper, Klein, & 
Jaskiewicz (2008) 







goal alignment  
(FPEC scale) 
Board Presence  
% family in TMT 
Prescriptions Both theories can explain board presence: 
Agency = low goal alignment, have board 
Stewardship = high goal alignment, no board 
Prencipe, 
Markarian, & Pozza 
(2008) 







Regression R&D cost 
capitalization 
Performance 
(change in profit) 
Prescriptions Both theories can explain why family firms 
are less sensitive to short term performance 
and stock fluctuations; agency and 
















Prescriptions Stewardship is advantageous for 
internationalization; agency prescriptions 
should govern the business and the family 
Westhead & 
Howorth (2006) 





Regression Ownership and 
management 
structure 
Performance Leadership Management rather than ownership structure 





 The common theme of these seven articles is the conclusion that both agency and 
stewardship theory apply in family firms. The articles comport to theoretical tenets by 
highlighting the principal-manager relationship, such as structure of the relationship (e.g., 
Westhead and Howorth, 2006) or the goal alignment between the parties in the relationship (e.g., 
Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007; Pieper, Klein, and Jaskiewicz, 2008), with considerations of the 
family firm context, such as family involvement (e.g., Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009) or 
family ownership (Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, and Pieper, 2012). A secondary theme in this 
literature is the focus on aspects of leadership or on theoretical prescriptions; my review is 
grouped accordingly. 
 Leadership. There are three articles that adopt both agency and stewardship perspectives 
with a focus on leadership aspects in family firms (e.g., Blumentritt, Keyt, and Astrachan, 2007; 
Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009; Westhead and Howorth, 2006). Both theories are used to 
explain leadership success (e.g., Blumentritt et al., 2007), leadership’s impact on firm 
performance (e.g., Westhead and Howorth, 2006), and leadership embeddedness (e.g., Le 
Breton-Miller and Miller 2009). Leadership success is investigated through both an agency and 
stewardship lens by Blumentritt and colleagues (2007). They argue that both theories are equally 
applicable in a family firm context in their examination of CEO competencies and board support 
on the success of a nonfamily CEO. Success stems from an agency perspective in that principals 
hire the most competent and skilled CEOs to run their business, and from a stewardship 
perspective in that the CEO must build a relationship with the family, fit with the organizational 
culture, and rely on the board for support rather than monitoring (Blumentritt et al., 2007).  
The impact of leadership on family firm performance is examined in Westhead and 




performance. They argue that agency theory is applicable when owners focus on financial 
objectives of the firm and thus implement agency prescriptions to monitor managers. They also 
argue that stewardship theory is applicable when owners focus on nonfinancial objectives, or 
“family agendas” (Westhead and Howorth, 2006: 303). Furthermore, they suggest that the CEO 
has the greatest power in influencing the objectives and thus performance of family firms.  
In a similar vein, leadership embeddedness is also examined from both an agency and 
stewardship perspective. Embeddedness is defined as “the relationship between an actor’s 
economic behavior and the social context in which it occurs” (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 
2009: 1171). The conceptual work of Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2009) concludes that agency 
and stewardship environments within a family business are a manifestation of the level of family 
embeddedness. They suggest that if the family is more embedded in the family than the business, 
an agency environment will prevail because of the hierarchical nature of family and the family’s 
self-serving interest. In contrast, if the family is more embedded in the business than the family, 
a stewardship environment will prevail because the family is willing to put the interest of the 
business first (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009). 
 In conclusion, these three articles support both sides of the agency versus stewardship 
debate by their focus on various aspects of leadership within family firms. In turn, firm 
performance is impacted by leadership, whether it’s due to leadership success, goals, or social 
embeddedness. Firm performance is also impacted by various prescriptions prescribed by both 
agency theory and stewardship theory; articles focused on these theoretical prescriptions are 
described next. 
Prescriptions. There are four articles that adopt both agency and stewardship perspectives 




Prencipe et al., 2008; Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, and Pieper, 2012). The dominant theoretical 
prescription in this group of literature is a board of directors. Instead of a focus on the board of 
directors’ impact on financial performance, articles focus on the impact of agency and 
stewardship perspectives on the presence of a board of directors (e.g., Pieper et al., 2008) and 
board characteristics (Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007). This line of research suggests that when goal 
alignment is high between the owners and managers, a stewardship environment will prevail and 
the less likely the need for a board of directors (Pieper et al., 2008). In contrast, when goals 
diverge, a board of directors is more likely (Pieper et al., 2008), and the board should be larger in 
size and have a higher ratio of outside members, thus resulting in an agency environment 
(Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007).  
 Additional agency prescriptions are studied from a dual theoretical approach, with the 
outcome being family firm internationalization (Sciascia et al., 2012). Research suggests that 
family ownership can have either a positive or negative effect on internationalization decisions. 
The positive effects are explained from a stewardship perspective in that family members want 
the business to succeed because success ultimately benefits the family. The negative effects are 
explained from a stagnation perspective, suggesting family firms lack resources, are 
conservative, and have family conflicts (Sciascia, et al., 2012). Although this research considers 
stagnation instead of agency as the comparative lens with the stewardship perspective, it is 
included in this category of articles because agency theory prescriptions are argued. This 
research suggests that monitoring mechanisms, creating a hierarchical form of governance, and 
implementing a board of directors may be necessary to overcome stagnation and realize the 




  In summary, these articles support perspectives from both agency and stewardship 
theory with a focus on theoretical prescriptions, such as a board of directors and other monitoring 
mechanisms. Essentially, these articles suggest that boards are necessary in an agency 
environment and not necessary in a stewardship environment; monitoring mechanisms are 
necessary for the family and the business to succeed. 
Limitations and Future Research. Although some scholars agree that both theories can be 
applicable in a family firm context, this research suffers from two notable limitations. First, these 
articles are not necessarily about both theories. Both refers to occurring together; although the 
authors suggest that both theoretical lenses are adopted, none of the articles consider 
simultaneous application of both theories. Instead, this research appears to take an either-or 
theoretical perspective. Accordingly, no new insights beyond what was gleaned from the 
literature supporting a single theoretical perspective could be gleaned from this group of 
literature. Future research that adopts simultaneous theoretical considerations is thus warranted.  
Second, research in this stream tends to reverse the order of causality as originally 
theorized. Agency theory assumes that agents are self-serving; and therefore, principals will 
enact governance mechanisms to curb the opportunistic behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Stewardship theory assumes that stewards are other-serving; and therefore, 
principals will create an environment that empowers and fosters this stewardship behavior (Davis 
et al., 1997). However, this line of research instead considers the reverse. For example, 
Jaskiewicz and Klein (2007) suggest that goal alignment triggers a stewardship environment and 
goal misalignment triggers an agency environment. However, theory suggests that a stewardship 
environment triggers the choice of stewardship among managers and therefore goals will align; 




between principals and agents. Therefore, future research should include both the contributing 
factors and resulting outcomes of agency and stewardship theories, and it the order proffered. 
Alternatively, research should address the rationale for applying theory in a way not originally 
theorized. 
Conclusion. This group of literature concludes that agency and stewardship theories can 
be equally applicable in a family firm context. This literature supports that family firms can be 
depicted by agency environments or stewardship environments and demonstrates that outcomes 
can be explained by either theoretical lens. However, this research seems to adopt an either-or 
perspective and neglects considerations of whether both agency and stewardship environments 
can coexist. More research is needed to determine if agency theory and stewardship theory can 
be integrated to more accurately capture the essence and causality of family firm structure, 
behavior, and performance. 
This concludes my review and synthesis of the family firm literature adopting both an 
agency and stewardship perspective. My second research question asks, ‘can the opposing 
prescriptions of agency theory and stewardship theory be integrated within family firms to 
explain firm performance?’ Based on my review and synthesis of this group of literature, I 
cannot sufficiently address this question. None of the literature integrates agency and 
stewardship prescriptions nor seeks to explain performance through both lenses. Accordingly, 
this question remains open as I transition to a concluding discussion regarding the family firm 
literature reviewed. 
Conclusion 
I provided a broad overview of agency theory and stewardship theory and a specific 




theories predict enhanced performance, but starkly contrast in behavioral assumptions and 
structural prescriptions (Chrisman et al., 2007). Agency theory assumes an economic model of 
man; agent behavior is based on self-interest and will conflict with the principal’s interest. 
Governance structures that control and monitor agents are prescribed to thwart opportunistic 
behavior and better align the goals of the principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Stewardship theory assumes a humanistic model of man; steward behavior is 
based on serving others and therefore will align with the principal’s interest. Governance 
structures that empower and encourage stewards are prescribed to facilitate the continued 
alignment of interests (Davis et al., 1997).  
There is an on-going debate in the family firm literature on whether agency theory and 
stewardship theory are applicable in this unique context (Le Breton Miller and Miller, 2009). The 
first objective of my dissertation research was to investigate both sides of the debate by 
examining the family firm literature grounded to each theoretical perspective. By doing so, I am 
able to address my first research question, ‘are the tenets, prescriptions, and related performance 
outcomes of (a) agency theory and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family firms?’ My 
review shows that the tenets, prescriptions, and performance outcomes of (a) agency theory and 
(b) stewardship theory can indeed apply to the family firm context.  
However, support on both sides of the agency versus stewardship debate creates 
ambiguous and confounding predictions about family firm behavior and performance. My review 
and synthesis revealed limitations of the existing literature that when addressed can provide 
additional insights into the appropriateness of these opposing theories within family firms. 
Accordingly, the second objective of my dissertation research is to address these limitations 




addresses my second research question, ‘can the opposing prescriptions of agency theory and 
stewardship theory be integrated within family firms to explain firm performance?’ Additionally, 
the empirical investigation will allow me to address my third research question, ‘does the family 
firm context (a) expand and/or (b) impose boundary conditions on agency and stewardship 
theories?’ To guide my empirical investigation, my research model and hypotheses are presented 
in the next section. 
Research Model and Hypotheses Development 
My research model seeks to address the gaps revealed in the literature review and 
synthesis. Extant studies investigate whether agency or stewardship theory is more applicable 
within family firms. Instead, my research investigates whether agency and stewardship theory 
can be integrated to explain family firm performance. My research model intertwines structural 
and behavioral components of agency and stewardship perspectives, making predictions within, 
across, and integrating theories.  
To reiterate, theory suggests that the organizational structure enacted by the principal 
influences the manager’s choice of agency versus stewardship behavior, and that the fit between 
the principal’s choice and manager’s choice impacts the performance outcome of the 
relationship. My study incorporates these suggestions by modeling firm level performance as the 
outcome of agency and stewardship structures, but mediated through agency and stewardship 
behaviors. Thereby, the differing governance prescriptions and behavioral assumptions of both 
theories are integrated in the same research model (see Figure 2.3). 
A principal is one who delegates work to a manager, regardless of actual position within 
the organizational hierarchy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ross, 1973). Accordingly, this research defines 




as an extension of the leader; therefore, the organizational structure reflects his or her values 
(Carney, 2005; Kelly, Athanassiou, and Crittenden, 2000) and thus the principal’s choice. The 
manager in the principal-manager relationship is defined as either a family or nonfamily 
employee of the family business. Accordingly, the employees’ behavior is depicted as the 
manager’s choice.  
Within the agency theory framework (i.e., depicted above the dotted horizontal line in 
Figure 2.3), agency structure serves as a proxy for the principal’s choice of agency. It represents 
the principal’s adoption of agency prescriptions, such as the presence of a board of directors, 
compensation incentive plans, and monitoring activities. This governance structure decreases the 
manager’s agent behavior (i.e., free-riding, shirking), thus enabling increased firm performance. 
Within the stewardship theory framework (i.e., depicted below the dotted horizontal line 
in Figure 2.3), stewardship structure serves as a proxy for the principal’s choice of stewardship. 
It represents the principal’s adoption of stewardship prescriptions, such as an involvement-
oriented and collectivist work environment. This stewardship governance structure increases the 
manager’s steward behavior. In turn, firm performance is increased.  
Across agency and stewardship theoretical frameworks, this research predicts behavioral 
outcomes across theories by examining the impact of mismatched choices in the principal-
manager relationship. Specifically, I investigate the consequences of the principal’s adoption of 
an agency structure on the manager’s steward behavior and the principal’s adoption of a 
stewardship structure on the manager’s agent behavior. Furthermore, I predict the impact of 
mismatched choices in the principal-manager relationship is different when kinship status is 




The development of nine hypotheses predicting the relationships in the proposed research 
model is presented next; a list of these hypotheses is presented in Table 2.6. The research model 
is a mediation model; however, I hypothesize direct effect relationships in this section and 
address the mediation effects in the results and discussion section (e.g., Eddleston and 
Kellermanns, 2007; Memili, Eddleston, Kellermanns, Zellweger, and Barnett, 2010). The first 
four hypotheses are predictions within theory, the next four hypotheses are predictions across 
theory, and the final hypothesis is a prediction integrating theory. More specifically, the within 
theory hypotheses address the structure-behavior-performance link within the confines of agency 
theory and stewardship theory, respectively. The across theory hypotheses address the 
mismatched structure-behavior choices between the principal and manager; different 
relationships are hypothesized for family managers and nonfamily managers. The integrating 
theory hypothesis examines the impact of structural integration (i.e., agency and stewardship 





































Table 2.6: Hypothesized Relationships 
Within Agency Theory 
H1 Agency structure is negatively associated with agent behavior. 
H2 Agent behavior is negatively associated with firm performance. 
Within Stewardship Theory 
H3 Stewardship structure is positively associated with steward behavior. 
H4 Steward behavior is positively associated with firm performance. 
Across Theory 
H5a Agency structure is negatively associated with steward behavior. 
H5b Kinship status moderates the relationship between agency structure and steward behavior, such that 
the negative relationship strengthens for family employees and weakens for nonfamily employees. 
H6a Stewardship structure is positively associated with agent behavior. 
H6b Kinship status moderates the relationship between stewardship structure and agent behavior, such that 





The interaction of agency and stewardship structures results in varying levels of firm performance. 
Specifically, the Trust But Monitor Structure results in the highest level of firm performance, 
followed by the Monitor Structure, then Trust Structure, with the Undetermined Structure resulting in 





Within Agency Theory 
 Agency theory rests on the following causal assumptions: (1) principals will enact an 
organizational governance structure that curbs the manager’s assumed self-interested agent 
behavior; (2) agent behavior is therefore curbed; (3) thus leading to increased firm performance 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wasserman, 2006). My review of the family firm literature reveals 
that studies empirically neglect the second causal assumption; meaning, studies examine the 
direct relationship between governance structure and firm performance. Instead, my research 
incorporates agent behavior as a mediator in this relationship. Accordingly, as theory predicts, 
when both principals and managers choose agency (i.e., principal’s choice manifested in an 
agency governance structure, and the manager’s choice depicted by actual behavior), firm 
performance is increased. 
Agency Structure and Agent Behavior. Agency structure serves as a proxy for the 
principal’s choice of agency. It represents the principal’s adoption of agency prescriptions, such 
as the presence of a board of directors (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Braun and Sharma, 2007), 
compensation incentive plans (Chrisman et al., 2007; Shulze et al., 2001, 2003), and monitoring 
activities (Chrisman et al., 2007). Theory suggests this type of governance structure decreases 
the manager’s agent behavior; it curbs opportunistic behavior such as free-riding and shirking 
(Wasserman, 2006). Accordingly, agent behavior, operationalized as counterproductive 
behavior, represents the manager’s choice of agency. 
Agent behavior is considered a type of counterproductive work behavior, defined as those 
deviant behaviors that threaten the organization’s well-being (Martinko, Gundlach, and Douglas, 
2002). Deviant behaviors can include opportunistic behavior such as free-riding or shirking. In 




to function better, and includes behavior typified by effectiveness, efficiency, and effort 
(Pritchard, 1995). It benefits the organization to have the work environment structured in such a 
way to elicit productive behavior and curb counterproductive behavior (Pritchard, 1995). 
Accordingly, agency theory prescribes an organizational governance structure for this intended 
purpose (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency structure is depicted by the presence of control and monitoring mechanisms such 
as a board of directors, monitoring activities, and compensation incentive plans (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). According to Daily, Dalton, and Cannella (2003: 372), “in nearly all modern 
governance research governance mechanisms are conceptualized as deterrents to managerial self-
interest.” The primary role of a board of directors is to monitor the managers of the organization 
to ensure the goals of the principal are being met and the free-rider problem is minimized 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Fama, 1980). Likewise, additional 
monitoring activities are often implemented for the purpose of ensuring that managers act in the 
interest of the principal (Chrisman et al., 2007; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Monitoring activities 
can take many forms, can be used on various types of employees (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), 
and have been shown to be successful in family firms (Chrisman et al., 2007). Monitoring serves 
the intended purpose of controlling agent behavior because when managers know they are being 
monitored, they will behave in a productive manner; without monitoring, agent managers will 
behave in a self-interested manner (Wright and Kroll, 2002). 
The adoption of compensation incentive plans, in which pay is provided as an incentive 
for high performance outcomes, is another agency prescription used to align the managers’ 
interest with the principal (Fama, 1980). Compensation incentives motivate managers to curb 




of the principal (Becker and Huselid, 1992). Numerous studies provide support that 
compensation incentives increase productivity (i.e., decrease agent behavior; Huselid, 1995; 
Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992; Rynes, Gerhart, and Parks, 2005). For example, studies 
demonstrate that compensation incentives have increased employee productivity by as much as 
30% (Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, and Denny, 1980) and even 44% (Lazear, 1986). In a 
recent meta-analysis, results indicate that compensation incentives increased employee task 
performance by 23%. Using an agency theory lens, Sesil and colleagues demonstrate that 
incentive compensation increases employee productivity (Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi, and Kruse, 
2002). As stated by Barringer and Milkovich (1998: 310), “outcome-based contracts provide 
powerful incentives for agents to be as productive as possible.” Taken together, I predict that 
agency structure, consisting of monitoring and control mechanisms (i.e., board of directors, 
monitoring activities, compensation incentive plans), will decrease counterproductive agent 
behavior. Stated formally: 
H1: Agency structure is negatively associated with agent behavior.  
 
Agent Behavior and Firm Performance. Decreasing agent behavior is beneficial for an 
organization (Pritchard, 1995) from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Theoretically, 
according to agency theory, increased firm performance is predicted when both the principal and 
the manager in the principal-manager relationship choose agency (Davis et al., 1997). Managers 
react to the use of agency governance structures by decreasing their agent behavior, thus 
resulting in increased firm performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). This decrease in agent behavior can 
be thought of as an increase in productive behavior. Empirically, productive behavior has been 
shown to be positively associated with corporate financial performance (Gerhart and Milkovich, 




2003). Additionally, Lee (2006) suggests that employee productivity is positively associated with 
the performance levels specifically within family firms. My research focuses on the relationship 
between counterproductive behavior and firm performance, therefore the association becomes 
negative. Formally stated, I hypothesize: 
H2: Agent behavior is negatively associated with firm performance.  
 
Within Stewardship Theory 
 Stewardship theory rests on the following causal assumptions: (1) principals will enact an 
organizational governance structure that empowers and motivates the manager’s assumed other-
interested steward behavior; (2) steward behavior is therefore increased; (3) thus leading to 
increased firm performance (Davis et al., 1997). My review of the family firm literature reveals 
that studies empirically neglect both causal assumptions; meaning, studies examine the direct 
relationship between stewardship structure and firm performance or the relationship between 
steward behavior and firm performance. Instead, my research considers the entire causal chain 
by incorporating steward behavior as a mediator in the relationship between stewardship 
structure and firm performance. Accordingly, as theory predicts, when both principals and 
managers choose stewardship (i.e., principal’s choice manifested in stewardship structure, and 
the manager’s choice depicted by actual behavior), firm performance is increased. 
Stewardship Structure and Steward Behavior. Stewardship structure represents the 
principal’s choice of stewardship. It depicts the adoption of stewardship prescriptions, such as 
the presence of an involvement-oriented (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al., 
2012) and collectivist culture (Dibrell and Moeller, 2011; Le Breton-Miller and Miller; Zahra et 
al., 2008). Research suggests that stewardship structures increase steward behavior (Davis et al., 




Steward behavior represents the managers’ choice of stewardship, and is operationalized 
as organizational value commitment in this research. Organizational value commitment is 
defined as “identification and alignment with the business, specifically with the beliefs and 
values that it represents” (Angle and Perry, 1981; Davis et al., 2010: 1096), and has been used as 
a proxy for steward behavior in extant theoretical (e.g., Davis et al., 1997) and empirical (e.g., 
Davis et al., 2010; Vallejo 2009) studies. Research suggests that value commitment is a relevant 
steward behavior because when organizational members share the same values as the 
organization, they see the organization as an extension of themselves (Davis et al., 2010) and 
work toward its best interest (i.e., pro-organizational behavior).  
It benefits the organization to have the work environment structured in such a way to 
facilitate steward behavior. Accordingly, stewardship theory prescribes an organizational 
governance structure for this intended purpose (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship structures are 
depicted by the presence of an involvement-oriented and collectivistic culture (Davis et al., 1997; 
Zahra et al., 2008). An involvement-oriented culture, such as one depicted by high levels of 
information exchange and social interaction, empowers steward behavior. Empowerment refers 
to “an employee’s feelings of competence, meaningfulness, choice, and impact in their job or 
work role” (Wall, Cordery, and Clegg, 2002: 147). When an employee finds meaning in their 
job, levels of pro-organizational behavior are found to increase (Madison and Kellermanns, 
2013). Collectivistic cultures encourage and empower employees to behave as stewards with a 
focus on the social system rather than on self-interested goals (Davis et al., 1997; Lee and 
O’Neill, 2003). Accordingly, I hypothesize: 





Steward Behavior and Firm Performance. Increasing steward behavior is beneficial for 
an organization from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Theoretically, according to 
stewardship theory, increased firm performance is predicted when both the principal and the 
manager in the principal-manager relationship choose stewardship (Davis et al., 1997). Managers 
react to the use of stewardship governance structures by increasing their steward behavior, thus 
resulting in increased firm performance.  
Managers who have high levels of organizational value commitment accept the 
organization’s goals and work toward accomplishing them (Mayer and Schoorman, 1992; Pieper, 
Klein, and Jaskiewicz, 2008). Accordingly, research supports the positive relationship between 
organizational commitment and firm performance (Kunze, Boehm, and Bruch, 2011; Ostroff, 
1992). The relationship between steward behavior and firm performance has also been supported 
in the context of family firms. Vallejo (2009) finds that high identification with the family 
business is positively linked to firm profitability and survival. Davis and colleagues (2010) state 
that steward behavior is what gives family firms a competitive advantage. Eddleston and 
Kellermanns (2007) demonstrate that steward behavior positively impacts the growth and 
financial performance of family firms. Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
H4: Steward behavior is positively associated with firm performance.  
 
Across Theory 
 With both agency and stewardship predictions incorporated in the same model, additional 
theoretical assumptions can be empirically tested. When the parties in the principal-manager 
relationship make different choices in agency or stewardship, negative consequences can arise 
(Davis et al., 1997). If a principal chooses agency and implements an agency governance 




(Pieper et al., 2008); if a principal chooses stewardship by implementing a stewardship 
governance structure, agent managers are afforded the opportunity to behave in a self-interested 
manner (Davis et al., 1997). The next set of hypotheses examines these across theory 
consequences, with different predictions made for family and nonfamily employees of the family 
firm. 
Agency Structure and Steward Behavior. Agency structures may curb the opportunistic 
behavior of agents, but might have different effects on stewards (Wasserman, 2006). Said 
differently, “what works well to control or motivate an opportunistic manager may not work well 
to control or motivate a steward” (Lee and O’Neill, 2003: 212; Pieper et al., 2008). Stewards are 
motivated to behave in the best interest of the organization (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Lee and O’Neill, 2003). However, behavior is affected by the governance structure 
present; theory suggests a steward performs best in a governance structure typified by 
empowerment, autonomy, and trust (Davis et al., 1997). This type of governance structure 
motivates stewards to continue to strive for the realization of organizational goals above self-
interested goals (Davis et al., 1997). 
In contrast, agency structures are implemented as a way of controlling self-interested 
behavior, rather than empowering other-interested behavior. Accordingly, for stewards under 
agency structures, motivation is decreased and pro-organizational behavior is undermined 
(Argryis, 1964; Chrisman et al., 2007; Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 1997). 
Additionally, the use of control mechanisms can offend and betray stewards (Patel, Eddleston, 
and Kellermanns, 2011). These monitoring and control mechanisms, such as compensation 
incentives, can also “result in a narrowing focus on individual goals to the exclusion of value-




imposing an agency structure on a steward manager lowers pro-organizational behavior. 
Accordingly, I hypothesize:  
H5a: Agency structure is negatively associated with steward behavior. 
 
Although I hypothesize a negative relationship between agency structure and steward 
behavior, I argue this relationship is moderated by kinship status. I suggest steward behavior is 
affected by fairness perceptions based on equity theory; tension is created by unfair conditions, 
and people will resolve their tension by lowering their level of pro-organizational behavior until 
equity is perceived (Moorman, 1991). Or simply and positively put, if employees perceive fair 
treatment, they will reciprocate by increasing their pro-organizational behavior (Ehrhart, 2004; 
Fassina, Jones, and Uggerslev, 2008).  
For family employees of the family business, I suggest the negative relationship between 
agency structure and steward behavior is strengthened due to perceptions of unfairness. Altruistic 
tendencies within the family firm are suggested to result in family employees receiving higher 
levels of compensation or higher ranking positions within the organization, regardless of their 
qualifications (Chua et al., 2009; Karra et al., 2006; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003a). Additionally, 
family employees of the family business are viewed as agents (Chrisman et al., 2007) and have 
an inclination to free-ride or shirk by taking advantage of the altruistic behavior afforded to them 
(Dawson, 2011; Eddleston et al., 2008; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003a). As such, family member 
employees of the family business often feel a sense of entitlement (Karra et al., 2006; Chua et al., 
2009). Agency structures, where family member behavior and outcomes are monitored and 
controlled, create an environment where family employees are treated the same as nonfamily 
employees and do not receive special treatment or perquisites (Schulze et al., 2003a). 




be entitled to them by being a member of the family and will thus lower their pro-organizational 
behavior.  
For nonfamily employees of the family business, I suggest the negative relationship 
between agency structure and steward behavior is weakened. I argue this is due to nonfamily 
employees’ perceptions of fairness in family firms with agency structures in place. Family firms 
are often associated with perceptions of favoritism and bias (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006; 
Lee, 2006; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, and Dino, 2005). The presence of an agency structure, 
where monitoring mechanisms are implemented and applied consistently throughout the firm can 
facilitate a sense of fairness for nonfamily employees (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006). For 
example, incentive compensation and performance appraisal systems can promote fairness by 
demonstrating that pay is based on objective measures, rather than subjective and biased 
measures (Evans and Davis, 2005). Accordingly, an agency structure instills to nonfamily 
employees that they are working in an organization that promotes fairness. Moving from 
perceptions of inequity to equity will enhance the pro-organizational behavior of nonfamily 
employees. Taken together, I hypothesize: 
H5b: Kinship status moderates the relationship between agency structure and steward 
behavior, such that the negative relationship strengthens for family employees and 
weakens for nonfamily employees. 
 
Stewardship Structure and Agent Behavior. Stewardship structures may empower pro-
organizational behavior of stewards, but might have different behavioral effects on agents. 
Stewardship governance structures are environments where managers are trusted and empowered 
to behave in the best interest of the organization (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 
1991). These types of structures are considered to be “dysfunctional under the agency theory 




with agent managers because they may allow for opportunistic agent behavior rather than 
productive work behavior to prevail. Without controls in place to monitor behavior, agency 
theory assumes the agent manager will act in a self-interested manner (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Wiseman et al., 2012).  
Agent behavior, or counterproductive behavior, is likely to surface under a stewardship 
structure for several reasons. A stewardship structure depicts a socially interactive and 
collectivistic work environment (Davis et al., 1997; Dibrell and Moeller, 2011; Eddleston and 
Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al., 2012; Zahra et al., 2008). Considerable time and effort 
invested in social interactions may increase counterproductive behavior and may not be cost 
effective (Molina-Morales and Martínez-Fernández, 2009). Specifically in family firms, social 
interactions may involve more time spent discussing family affairs rather than business affairs 
(Zhang, Cone, Everett, and Elkin, 2011). Collectivistic work environments can also increase 
counterproductive behavior due to social loafing, defined as “the reduction in motivation and 
effort when individuals work collectively compared with when they work individually” (Karau 
and Williams, 1993: 681). It is suggested that social loafing enhances free-rider problems; 
individuals are compelled to reduce effort and productivity when working collectively because 
they assume individual contributions are less identifiable (George, 1992; Karau and Williams, 
1993). Additionally, research suggests that having a culture of camaraderie and cooperation 
among employees can have negative consequences such as employee complacency, sentiment-
based rather than rationally-based decision making, and an increased tolerance for social loafing 
(Griskevicius, Ackerman, Van den Bergh, and Li, 2011). This line of research, coupled with 
theoretical assumption that a mismatch in the principal and manager’s choice will lead to 




H6a: Stewardship structure is positively associated with agent behavior.  
 
However, I argue that kinship status moderates the relationship between stewardship 
structure and agent behavior. For family employees, I suggest the positive relationship is 
strengthened, meaning the negative consequences of stewardship structure on agent behavior are 
stronger. One of the characteristics unique to family firms is particularism, which can be 
described as a “tendency of the owner-managers to view the firm as ‘our business’” (Carney, 
2005: 255). Family members are usually in top management roles, can influence the strategic 
direction of the firm (Kelly, Athanassiou, and Crittenden, 2000), and often possess an emotional 
attachment to the firm (Bernhard and O’Driscoll, 2011; Mustakallio et al., 2002). Family 
members are often territorial and protective of their family business, and when feelings of 
infringement surface, counterproductive behavior may result (Rantanen and Jussila, 2011). A 
stewardship structure that promotes social interaction, information exchange, and a collectivistic 
work environment between family and nonfamily employees may trigger these feelings of 
infringement. Meaning, family employees may feel that nonfamily employees are infringing on 
their domain by an environment of inclusion, and therefore counterproductive behavior may 
result in the presence of a stewardship structure.  
In contrast, I argue that stewardship structure will have beneficial consequence on agent 
behavior of nonfamily employees of the family business. Nonfamily managers are part of the 
firm but not part of the family, and therefore may resent family members. In summarizing 
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001), Anderson and Reeb (2004: 212), state, 
“favoritism towards heirs and siblings can lead to family perquisites…leading to resentment by 
nonfamily managers.” Stewardship structures that encourage interaction between family and 




therefore lessening the feelings of resentment. This structure provides social interaction between 
family and nonfamily employees, and as such commitment to a shared vision can be formed 
(Mustakallio et al., 2002). It facilitates an environment where employees can exhibit productive 
behavior such as helping each other and encouraging the flow of information (Evans and Davis, 
2005). As such, I argue that nonfamily employees will react more favorably and decrease their 
level of agent behavior in the presence of a stewardship structure. Taken together, I hypothesize: 
H6b: Kinship status moderates the relationship between stewardship structure and agent 
behavior, such that the positive relationship strengthens for family employees and 
weakens for nonfamily employees. 
 
Integrating Theory 
This section presents my hypothesis integrating agency and stewardship theories to 
predict the performance of family firms. Theory assumes that the principal’s choice is either 
agency or stewardship. As Wasserman (2006: 961) states, “stewardship theory is more relevant 
in contexts in which agency theory is less relevant, and vice versa.” However, this fails to 
consider the simultaneous choice of agency and stewardship and neglects the organizational 
reality that work environments can include both agency and stewardship governance structures. 
As stated by Mahoney (2005: 151), “Barnard (1938) argues that formal and informal 
organization always and everywhere co-exist.” The presence of both structures would suggest 
the adoption of both agency and stewardship prescriptions for influencing manager behavior and 
ultimately firm performance.  
I argue that the integration of agency and stewardship structures results in increased firm 
performance over the use of just one structure alone. Furthermore, I suggest that organizations 
can have varying levels and combinations of both these structures, each with a different impact 




structure and a low level of stewardship structure, labeled Monitor Structure; (2) high levels of 
both agency and stewardship structures, labeled Trust But Monitor Structure; (3) low levels of 
both agency and stewardship structures, labeled Undetermined Structure; and (4) a low level of 






Separately, agency structures (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Braun and Sharma, 2007; 
Chrisman et al., 2007) and stewardship structures (e.g., Craig and Dibrell, 2006) have been 
shown to increase firm performance in family firms. However, I suggest that firm performance 
will be enhanced when both structures are used in combination. When both are present, agency 
structures will curb undesired agent behavior, but not at the expense of endangering steward 
behavior; steward behavior is still influenced by the simultaneous stewardship structure. 
Likewise, stewardship structures will empower steward behavior, but not at the expense of 
Table 2.7: Governance Structure Integration 
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allowing agent behavior to surface; self-interested behavior is still being curbed by the 
simultaneous agency structure. Accordingly, an organizational environment that includes agency 
and stewardship governance structures will result in positive behavior and thus increased firm 
performance, regardless of whether managers are stewards or agents. This argument diverges 
from theory in that it negates the negative consequences of mismatched choices because of its 
integration of both agency and stewardship theory prescriptions.  
Based on these arguments, I predict the highest level of firm performance will be found 
in organizations with high levels of both agency and stewardship structures. Trust But Monitor 
Structures would simultaneously curb agent behavior and increase steward behavior, thus 
resulting in higher levels of firm performance. Support for this argument is also found in the 
control literature; in a qualitative case study, Cardinal and colleagues found that integrated and 
balanced levels of both formal (e.g., agency) and informal (e.g., stewardship) controls led to 
higher firm performance than having imbalanced controls in place (Cardinal, Sitkin, and Long, 
2004). As such, I suggest that organizations with Trust But Monitor Structures would have the 
highest levels of firm performance. 
The structural combination I predict would lead to the second highest firm performance 
level is the Monitor Structure, or those with a high level of agency structure and a low level of 
stewardship structure. I then predict the Trust Structure, depicted as having a high level of 
stewardship structure and a low level of agency structure, to have the third highest firm 
performance level. These predictions are based on my review and interpretation of the family 
firm literature. Agency theory has long been associated with economic performance outcomes, 
and therefore, the relationship between agency prescriptions and firm performance is more 




2004; Chrisman et al., 2011; Chrisman et al., 2007; Chua et al., 2006; Lester and Cannella, 2006; 
Schulze et al., 2003; Schulze et al., 2011). Conversely, although stewardship theory predicts 
increased performance, much of the extant family firm stewardship literature focuses on 
noneconomic outcome variables (e.g., Davis et al., 2010; Miller et al, 2008; Pearson and Marler, 
2010; Zahra et al., 2008). Taken together, there is stronger and more support for agency theory 
over stewardship theory prescriptions having a positive impact on the performance of the family 
firm. As such, I predict that firms with Monitor Structures would have higher performance levels 
than firms with Trust Structures. 
Lastly, I predict that firms with low levels of both agency and stewardship structures, or 
an Undetermined Structure, would have the lowest level of firm performance when compared to 
the other structural combinations. The lack of both agency and stewardship structures would 
create an organizational environment where agent behavior might prevail and steward behavior 
might be reduced, thereby impacting the performance of the firm. Summarizing these arguments, 
I formally hypothesize: 
H7: The interaction of agency and stewardship structures results in varying levels of firm 
performance. Specifically, the Trust But Monitor Structure results in the highest level of 
firm performance, followed by the Monitor Structure, then Trust Structure, with the 
Undetermined Structure resulting in the lowest level of firm performance.  
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the theoretical tenets of agency and stewardship theories encompass 
structure, behavior, and performance. The organizational structure enacted by the principal 
influences the manager’s choice of agent versus steward behavior, and the fit between the 
principal’s choice and manager’s choice impacts the performance outcome of the relationship. 
My study incorporates these suggestions by modeling firm level performance as the outcome of 




the differing governance prescriptions and behavioral assumptions of both theories are integrated 
in the same model. 
 As theorized by agency theory, I predict that agency structures will decrease agent 
behavior; therefore both the principal and manager have chosen agency, and firm performance 
will increase. As theorized by stewardship theory, I predict that stewardship structures will 
increase steward behavior; therefore both the principal and manager have chosen stewardship, 
and firm performance will increase. Additionally, I consider across theory implications. Theory 
suggests negative consequences result from the principal and manager making different choices 
in agency or stewardship; my predictions comport with these theoretical assumptions, but only 
for the behavior of family employees of the business. These predictions imply that for family 
employees, an agent always behaves as an agent and a steward always behaves as a steward. 
Mismatched choices will result in negative consequences; family agents will act 
opportunistically in a stewardship environment and family stewards will feel betrayed in an 
agency environment.  
However, I predict positive across theory behavior for nonfamily employees; therefore, 
diverging from theoretical assumptions for nonfamily employees of the business. These 
predictions imply that for nonfamily employees, the work environment implemented by the 
principal can influence or alter the manager’s behavior. A principal enacting an agency 
environment on a nonfamily steward or enacting a stewardship environment on a nonfamily 
agent can still have a positive impact on the behavior and ultimately the performance of the firm.  
I also make predictions based on integrating agency and stewardship perspectives. I 
suggest that family firms can have agency and stewardship structures operating side by side 




have a differing impact on the performance of family firms. This integration narrows the distance 
between oposing theoretical views and provides a foundation on which future research can build. 
This concludes Chapter 2. In this chapter, I provided an overview of agency theory and 
stewardship theory, then transitioned to examining these theories within the context of family 
firms. I answered my first research question by concluding that both agency theory and 
stewardship theory are applicable within family firms, but suggested the theories needed to be 
integrated to offer additional explanations for family firm behavior and performance. 
Accordingly, I presented an integrated research model and the development of hypotheses 
within, across, and integrating theories with considerations of kinship status; the next chapter 





CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
A detailed account of the methodology used to test the research model and hypotheses is 
provided in this chapter. A general overview is provided first, followed by a specific description 
of the survey instrument and approach, sample, and measures. The chapter concludes with a 
description of the data analysis process, including the diagnostic and bias tests conducted prior to 
testing the hypotheses in the research model.  
Overview 
I collected data via surveys mailed to family firms, a common method among family firm 
researchers (Eddleston et al., 2008). The uniqueness of my approach stems from utilizing 
multiple respondent types; I collected survey data from the leader, a family employee, and a 
nonfamily employee of the family firm. A mailing list of 2165 family firms was obtained from a 
combination of sources, but primarily from undergraduate business students at a major US 
university. The survey instrument contained previously validated and accepted scales or adapted 
scales to accommodate the family firm context: firm performance was collected from the leader, 
perceptions of governance structures were collected from both employee types, and perceptions 
of employee behavior were captured from the leader. Data is analyzed with OLS regression, with 
tests for mediation and moderation via a subgroup analysis. A more detailed explanation of the 
survey instrument, survey approach, sample, measures, and data analysis is provided next.  
Survey Instrument 
 Mail surveys are frequently used in empirical studies within the social sciences (Dillman, 
1991), and more specifically within small and medium enterprises (Newby, Watson, and 
Woodliff, 2003) and family firms (Eddleston et al., 2008). As such, it is an appropriate approach 




researchers; therefore, certain survey design and administration methods have been suggested to 
increase the number of responses (Dillman, 1991; Newby et al., 2003). From a design 
perspective, it has been suggested that surveys indicating university sponsorship (Greer and 
Lohtia, 1994; Kanso, 2000), assuring anonymity of respondents (Kanso, 2000), using colored 
paper and booklet formatting (Dillman, 1991; Kanso, 2000; Newby et al., 2003), including 
postage paid return envelopes (Kanso, 2000) and personalization (Dillman, 1991) can increase 
response rates. From an administrative perspective, mailing follow-up reminders and 
replacement questionnaires is also found to increase response rates (Creswell, 2009; Dillman, 
1991; Salant and Dillman, 1994). 
 Accordingly, my survey instrument contained: (1) a statement of university affiliation 
and sponsorship including contact information for the university’s research compliance officer; 
(2) a statement assuring the anonymity of the respondent; (3) colored paper (e.g., ivory for the 
firm leader, orange for the family employee, and blue for the nonfamily employee); (4) booklet 
formatting; and (5) postage paid return envelopes stapled to each survey. Follow-up packets were 
mailed to nonresponding firms and included a personalized cover letter of reminder, replacement 
questionnaires, and postage paid return envelopes. 
Survey Approach 
Although survey methodology is commonplace in family firm research (Eddleston and 
Kellermanns, 2007), my research approach is unique because of the utilization of multiple 
respondent types. I collected survey data from the leader, a family member employee, and a 
nonfamily employee of the family firm. As such, three surveys were developed, one for each 
respondent type. The leader survey contained questions about firm level characteristics, such as 




and perceptions of employee agency and stewardship behavior. The family and nonfamily 
employee surveys contained identical items, with the exception of asking the family member for 
his/her relationship to the founder. Scales contained in these surveys were previously validated 
and sought to ascertain perceptions of agency and stewardship governance structures. Additional 
details regarding the variables and scale items is found in the measures section. 
To accommodate my survey approach, I assembled packets for each family firm. The 
packet included a cover letter on university letterhead and a survey for completion by the leader, 
family member, and nonfamily member. The packets were mailed to a named contact of family 
firm; in most cases, this named contact was the leader of the business. The cover letter provided 
instructions for survey distribution (e.g., the ivory survey is for the leader, the orange survey is 
for a family member, the blue survey is for a nonfamily member; the surveys were also titled 
accordingly). Each survey had a postage paid return envelope stapled to it to ensure anonymity 
(e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al., 2008) and to increase response rates 
(Kanso, 2000). The surveys were numbered alike for each business in order to match multiple 
responses to the same family firm (e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al., 
2008).  
Sampling Frame 
A list of family businesses was obtained from a combination of soliciting contact 
information of known family firms from undergraduate business students at a large public 
university in the southeastern US, searching newspapers and websites for articles about family 
businesses, and attending local forums specifically for family business owners. This approach 
yielded a sampling frame of 2165 family firms, which was then reduced to 2024 firms following 




responses of ‘not a family business’ (16), or expressed disinterest (11). After initial and follow-
up mailings to these 2024 firms, I received 408 completed surveys representing 192 distinct 
family firms for a total organizational response rate of 9.5% (see Table 3.1). However, data will 
be analyzed in matched triads, meaning a survey must have been received from the leader, a 
family employee, and a nonfamily employee of the same family firm. This constrains my sample 













Survey Responses Organizational Responses 
Leader Family Nonfamily Total # of Organizations Response Rate
c
 
Students 1379 71 128 95 95 318 148 11.3% 
Community 697 66 30 15 17 62 33 5.2% 
Media 82 4 9 8 11 28 11 14.1% 
Personal 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 
Total 2165 141 167 118 123 408 192 9.5% 
a Students: undergraduate students in business courses at The University of Tennessee Knoxville 
 Community: Knoxville Chamber of Commerce, Family Firm community meetings 
 Media: Web searches, newspapers, advertisements 
 Personal: Family businesses known to me 
b Includes undeliverable packets (114), responded “not a family business” (16), responded “not-interested in participating” (11) 




Source Triads Dyads (L-F) Dyads (L-NF) Dyads (F-NF) 
Students 65 81 81 70 
Community 8 14 11 8 
Media 4 5 6 5 
Personal 0 0 0 0 




Of interest to note, the highest organizational response rate of 14.1% came from the 
family firms obtained through the use of media outlets. This is not surprising given they are 
proudly advertising themselves as family businesses and would most likely be interested in 
assisting with a family firm research project. The lowest organizational response rate of 0.0% 
was from family businesses personally known to me. I assume these businesses did not respond 
because potentially they didn’t want me knowing sensitive information about their businesses or 
the responses from their employees. 
Measures 
The operationalization of each variable in the research model is discussed in this section. 
The dependent variable is described first, followed by a discussion of the independent, mediator, 
moderator, and control variables. A summary of the variables, measures, and data sources is 





Table 3.2: Summary of Variables, Measures, and Data Sources 




4-item subjective measure; growth relative to 
competition (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007) 
Principal (Firm Leader) 
 
Independent Variables 
Agency Governance Structure 
 Structure Board of Directors (Chrisman et al., 2004)  
Compensation Incentives (Schulze et al., 2001) 
Principal (Firm Leader)  
 
 Monitoring  5-item scale (Chrisman et al., 2007) Manager (family and 
nonfamily employees) 
Stewardship Governance Structure 
 Information Interaction 2-item information exchange frequency scale 
(adapted from Ling and Kellermanns, 2010) 
Manager (family and 
nonfamily employees) 
 Social Interaction  3-item social interaction scale 
(adapted from Mustakallio et al., 2002) 
Manager (family and 
nonfamily employees) 
Mediators 
Agent Behavior 3-item productivity scale (Nyhan, 2000); reverse 
coded 
Principal (Firm Leader) 
Steward Behavior 4-item organizational commitment scale (Nyhan, 
2000) 
Principal (Firm Leader) 
Moderator 
Kinship Status Family / Nonfamily Manager (family and 
nonfamily employees) 
Controls 
Firm-Level Industry (retail, services, other) 
Firm Age (number of years in existence)  
Size (number of employees) 
 
 






Dependent Variable: Family Firm Performance 
From a theoretical perspective, both agency and stewardship theories seek to explain firm 
performance. Within the strategy literature, the ultimate dependent variable is firm performance, 
and researchers try to explain as much of the predictive power as possible (Richard, Devinney, 
Yip, and Johnson, 2009). In the broadest terms, performance measures can be categorized as 
financial or nonfinancial (Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin, and Frese, 2009). More specifically, many 
types of performance are studied, such as operational performance (i.e., value-chain activities), 
organizational performance (i.e., sales growth, market share, accounting, and financial returns), 
or organizational effectiveness (i.e., survival; Combs, Crook, and Shook, 2005; Richard et al., 
2009).  
Accordingly, I captured an overall measure of firm performance from the family firm 
leader by asking four questions relating to the financial and nonfinancial growth of the firm 
(Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007). Growth is an important dependent variable in family firms 
because of the desire for transgenerational sustainability and to accommodate the growing 
family. Specifically, leaders were asked to indicate if the family firm’s growth was much worse, 
about the same, or better compared to the competitors on a seven-point scale. The average of the 
four items was used as the score for firm performance. The scale items are presented in Table 3.3 
(α = 0.83).  
Additionally, use of this performance measure has its benefits. First, subjective 
performance measures have been found to be reasonable indicators of performance; objective 
measures are often unavailable and tend to lower the survey response rate (Kellermanns et al., 
2008; Runyan, Droge, and Swinney, 2008). Second, objective performance measures have been 




Ramanujam, 1986), warranting the use of subjective performance measures in survey research.  
 
 
Table 3.3: Scale Items for Family Firm Performance 
How would you rate your firm’s performance as compared to your competitors? 
1 Growth in sales   
2 Growth in market share   
3 Growth in the number of employees   




Independent Variables: Agency and Stewardship Structures 
 Both agency and stewardship theories offer governance prescriptions for increased 
performance. Accordingly, agency and stewardship governance structures serve as the 
independent variables in this research and are described next. 
Agency Structure. From an agency perspective, governance mechanisms are implemented 
to curb the assumed self-interested behavior on the part of the agent. These agency governance 
prescriptions have been examined within family firms and include the presence of a board of 
directors (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chrisman et al., 2004), compensation incentive plans 
(Chrisman et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2001), and monitoring activities (Chrisman et al., 2007). 
Accordingly, my survey instrument included measures for each of these variables. 
The family firm leader was asked if the family firm was governed by a board of directors, 
indicated with a response of yes (coded ‘1’) or no (coded ‘0’). The family firm leader was asked 




indicated with a response of yes (coded ‘1’) or no (coded ‘0’). Monitoring activities were 
captured from family and nonfamily employees. The employees were asked five questions 
regarding how often the leader of the firm uses monitoring methods to obtain information on 
their activities and performance on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = never; 7 = very often). The responses on 
the five items were averaged to obtain the score for the level of monitoring. This scale utilized 
for monitoring methods came from Chrisman and his colleagues (2007) and is shown in Table 
3.4 (α = 0.84). 
An overall index of agency structure was created to ascertain the level of agency 
prescriptions present in the family firm; a high score indicating a high level of agency structure. 
This approach was necessary because firms may choose to implement a variety of agency 
prescriptions; and an absence of one prescription does not necessarily mean an absence of an 
agency structure (Chrisman et al., 2007). This index was calculated by summing four z-scores: 
(1) the presence of a board of directors, (2) a compensation incentive plan for family employees, 






Table 3.4: Scale Items for Agency Structure 
Structure 
1a Does this family firm have a compensation incentive plan for family members? 
1b Does this family firm have a compensation incentive plan for nonfamily members? 
2 Does this family firm have a governance board? 
Monitoring Activities: How often are the following methods used to obtain information on activities and 
performance? 
1 Personal direct observation 
2 Regular assessment of short-term output 
3 Progress toward long-term goals 
4 Input from other managers 




Stewardship Structure. A stewardship structure is typified by an involvement-oriented 
structure that encourages interaction and cooperation (Davis et al., 1997; Eddleston et al., 2012). 
This study uses the level of interaction between family and nonfamily employees in the family 
firm as a proxy for a stewardship governance structure, captured with five items on a scale of 1 
to 7 (1 = never, 7 = very often). Respondents are the employees, both family and nonfamily, of 
the family firm. Two questions capture interaction from an information exchange frequency 
perspective, defined as “the amount of interaction among team members, whether face-to-face or 
through telephone, written communication, and emails” (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010: 327). I 
argue that high levels of information exchange depict a culture that is involvement-oriented and 
supports interaction between employees. Accordingly, I used the scale from Ling and 
Kellermanns (2010), but adapted it to a family firm employee context. The scale originally was 




members, but it was used in this research to seek the level of interaction between family and 
nonfamily members of the family business. Additionally, I dropped one of the items, the level of 
written communication, due to its nonsignificant loading in a confirmatory factor analysis. 
Further justification for dropping this item is warranted because conceptually, ‘written’ 
communication does not necessarily capture interaction between employees.  
I also assessed the level of social interaction by use of a three-item scale from 
Mustakallio and colleagues (2002). They measured social interaction among family members of 
the business by assessing whether family members maintain close social relations, know each 
other personally, and visit each other regularly. Based on the lower than desired factor loading of 
the last item in the analysis of Mustakallio et al (2002), I dropped this item and added a similar 
item more aligned with the spirit of a stewardship governance structure by asking the frequency 
of social interactions occurring at company functions. Furthermore, I ascertained social 
interaction between family and nonfamily employees rather than between family members.  
Responses from the five items were averaged to obtain the score for a stewardship 
governance structure. This measure exhibited acceptable fit in a confirmatory factor analysis 
(χ²=3.39, df=3, p=0.335, RMSEA=0.041, CFI=0.997, GFI=0.982, NFI=0.979). Scale items are 





Table 3.5: Scale Items for Stewardship Structure 
How often do family members and nonfamily members of the firm 
1  Have face-to-face meetings 
 2* Have written communication (e.g. reports, email, personal notes, etc.) 
3 Have telephone conversations 
4 Maintain close social relations 
5 Know each other on a personal level 
6 Attend company functions (e.g. picnics, parties, get-togethers, etc) 




Mediators: Agent and Steward Behaviors  
Agent Behavior. Agent behavior is a form of opportunistic behavior that includes free-
riding or shirking (Chrisman et al., 2004; Chua et al., 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989; Karra et al., 2006), 
and refers to the situation where the agent lacks effort or is unproductive in the scope of the 
employment relationship (Chrisman et al., 2004; Ross, 1973). Accordingly, agent behavior was 
captured by reverse coding Nyhan’s (2000) three-item scale assessing employee productivity. A 
panel of practitioners and academics tested the scale for validity (Nyhan, 2000), and it has 
exhibited high reliability in empirical studies (α = .75 in Nyhan, 2000; α = .83 in Fry, Vitucci, 
and Cedillo, 2005). Responses were obtained from the leaders of the family firms on a seven-
point scale indicating the level of agreement with the statements (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = 
strongly agree). The scale items appear in Table 3.6 (α = 0.78).  
Steward Behavior. In line with Davis et al (2010), the employees’ level of value 
commitment to the organization was used in my research as a proxy for steward behavior. 




level of commitment to and identification with the organization (Davis et al., 1997; 2010). 
Accordingly, a previously validated four-item scale measuring this level of organizational value 
commitment (Nyhan, 2000) was used in this research. Responses to the level of steward behavior 
exhibited by employees were obtained from the leaders of the family firms on a seven-point 
scale indicating the level of agreement with the statements (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree). The scale items appear in Table 3.6 (α = 0.87). 
 
 
Table 3.6: Scale Items for Agent and Steward Behaviors 
Agent Behavior: Productivity (reverse coded) 
1 Everyone is busy in the organization; there is little idle time. 
2 Work quality is a high priority for all employees. 
3 Everyone in the organization gives his/her best efforts. 
Steward Behavior: Organizational Value Commitment 
1 Leadership makes everyone feel like “part of the family” in this organization. 
2 Employees would be very happy to spend the rest of their career with this organization.  
3 Employees talk up this organization to their friends as a great place to work. 




Moderator: Kinship Status 
 Kinship status, family versus nonfamily employee, is the moderator in this study. Kinship 
status was assessed primarily through the survey approach; I asked the firm leader to distribute 
the orange family survey to a family employee working in the business and the blue nonfamily 




on the top of both the orange and blue surveys that indicated whether it was for family or 
nonfamily employee completion. As an additional check, the family survey asked respondents to 
identify their relationship to the family firm leader and asked if they are a descendant of the 
family firm founder.    
Controls: Industry, Firm Age, Firm Size 
Control variables that have been associated with family firm performance are necessary 
in order to isolate the effect of interest. Consistent with extant family firm empirical studies, such 
as the work of Chrisman et al (2004) and Schulze et al (2001, 2003), the firm’s industry, age, and 
size serve as control variables in this study. Industry conditions may affect firm performance 
(Craig and Dibrell, 2006), and therefore, the firm’s industry was captured via the leader’s survey 
as either retail, services, or other (i.e., manufacturing, transportation). Age of the organization 
may also affect firm performance; research suggests that younger firms may have higher growth 
potential (Chrisman, et al., 2009; Memili, et al., 2010) or that older firms are in existence 
because they have had successful performance (Schulze et al., 2001). Therefore, I controlled for 
firm age, measured by years of existence and captured from the family firm leader. 
Organizational size is not only suggested to impact firm performance, but it potentially impacts 
agency and stewardship variables in the research model. Agency-related, Pieper et al (2008) 
suggest that larger organizations are more complex than smaller organizations, thereby making 
boards of directors necessary. Stewardship-related, Davis et al (2010) suggest that organizational 
size impacts the amount of social interation within a firm; the larger the firm, the less likely the 
interaction. Accordingly, I controlled for firm size by asking the family firm leader for the 







The data analysis section describes the statistical analyses used to test the hypothesized 
relationships in my research model. It contains a description of preliminary analysis, diagnostics 
tests, and necessary tests of biases. All tests were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 
21. 
 Agency theory and stewardship theory are both based on the principal-manager 
relationship. In order to match the empirical investigation with the theoretical underpinnings and 
my research model within the family firm context, data was analyzed using matched triads. Each 
triad was made up of the family firm leader, a family employee, and a nonfamily employee 
within the same family business (n=77 triads). In doing so, both sides of the principal-manager 
relationship are taken into consideration. A principal-manager relationship is depicted by the 
principal delegating work to the manager. Accordingly, the family firm leader represents the 
principal, and both family and nonfamily employees represent the manager.  
I analyzed matched triad data using OLS hierarchical regression, with tests for mediation 
and moderation. In order to use regression analysis, I aggregated the employee responses to the 
organizational level so that all variables would be at the same level of analysis. Before 
aggregation, I calculated rwg, or the level of within-group interrater agreement (James, Demaree, 
and Wolf, 1984), between employees within the same family firm. This calculation compares the 
variability of a variable within the firm to an expected variance. Aggregation from the individual 
level to the firm level is justified when the variability within the firm is smaller than the 
variability expected by chance, represented by an rwg of greater than 0.70 (Klein and Kozlowski, 




obtained from the employee responses was above this threshold (i.e., monitoring = 0.87; 
information exchange = 0.83; social interaction = .87). Thereby, aggregation was justified, and 
triad data at the organizational level was used during the entire data analysis phase, with the 
exception of the moderation hypotheses. 
To test the moderation hypotheses, data was analyzed using subgroups at the dyad level. 
The dyads consisted of family firm leaders matched with family employees of the same family 
firm and family firm leaders matched with nonfamily employees of the same family firm. The 
leader-family dyad was compared to the leader-nonfamily dyad. Accordingly, employee data 
from the family and nonfamily was not used in aggregate for the moderation tests. 
Before presenting the results of the data analysis of the hypothesized relationships in my 
research model, it is first necessary to explain the preliminary analysis, diagnostic tests, and bias 
tests conducted. A description, along with the results, of each of these tests is provided next.  
Preliminary Analysis 
Prior to data analysis, I checked for missing data because although the sample is random, 
a lack of a response may not be random (i.e., respondents refuse to answer a question). There 
were minimal missing data in my sample and no observable patterns of missing values. As such, 
and to preserve sample size in correlation and regression analysis, I followed the approach set 
forth in Allison (2001), and imputed missing data since less than 15% missing threshold was 
achieved across all variables. The percentage of missing values in the items of my variables 
ranged from 0% missing (i.e., the presence of a board of directors, the level of social interaction, 
agent behavior, industry, firm age, and firm size) to 11.04% missing (i.e., firm performance). 












Missing Method of Imputation 
Dependent Variable 
     Firm Performance 308 274 11.04% mean replacement 
Independent Variables 
     Agency Structure 
     Board of Directors 77 77 0.00% n/a 
 Compensation Incentives-Family 77 76 1.30% family survey response 
 Compensation Incentives-Nonfamily 77 75 2.60% nonfamily survey response 
 Monitoring
a
 770 741 3.77% mean replacement 
 Stewardship Structure 
     Information Exchange Frequency
b
 308 306 0.65% mean replacement 
 Social Interaction
c
 462 462 0.00% n/a 
Mediators 
     Agent Behavior 231 231 0.00% n/a 
 Steward Behavior 308 302 1.95% mean replacement 
Controls 
     Industry 77 77 0.00% n/a 
 Firm Age 77 77 0.00% n/a 
 Size 77 77 0.00% n/a 
a Monitoring: Family responses: 374/385 = 2.86% missing; Nonfamily responses: 367/385 = 4.68% missing 
b Information Exchange Frequency: Family responses: 153/154 = 0.65% missing; Nonfamily responses: 153/154 = 0.65% missing 




By way of example, there were 77 possible responses to the question asked of firm 
leaders as to whether there are compensations incentives for family employees (i.e., single item 
asked of all 77 firm leaders in the sample). A total of 76 responses were obtained; the missing 
value was imputed by using the survey response from the family employee of the same firm to 
the same question. As another example, there were 308 possible responses to the social 
interaction variable (2 items x 77 family employee responses + 2 items x 77 nonfamily employee 




imputed with the mean score of the item across all respondents. The variable with the highest 
percentage of missing values was firm performance. This was not surprising because missing 
data issues are quite common in empirical studies of family firms, especially when using primary 
data sources and when sensitive data, such as firm performance, is sought (Zellweger, 
Kellermanns, Chrisman, and Chua, 2012). 
Diagnostic Tests  
Before testing the research model and hypotheses, diagnostic tests were performed to 
ensure the data assumptions of random distribution, independence, normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity hold (Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003). 
Random distribution and independence. Random distribution refers to the assumption 
that the data were randomly sampled and there is variation in the responses. Independence refers 
to the assumption that the data are independent of one another, meaning that each observation is 
not influenced by any other observations. Both of these assumptions are met based on my survey 
approach.  
Normality. Scores for variables should be normally distributed, as depicted by a 
symmetrical, bell-shaped curve. Normality can be assessed with skewness (i.e., symmetry of the 
distribution) and kurtosis (peakedness of the distribution) statistics, a visual inspection of a 
histogram and a normal probability plot, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. The further 
away from zero the skewness and kurtosis statistic is, the less normal the distribution. Some 
research suggests that a skewness statistic of greater than twice the standard error and a kurtosis 
statistic greater than ± 3indicates a significant deviation from a normal distribution. Furthermore, 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test assesses the normality of the distribution with a non-significant 




The histogram displays the distribution of the data and includes a bell-shaped curve to indicate 
normality. The normal probability plot displays the observed value plotted against the expected 
value from a normal distribution, with a reasonably straight line indicating normality. Table 3.8 
presents the skewness, kurtosis, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, and Figure 3.1 displays the 



















 Firm Performance -0.22 0.27 0.28 .02 
Performance Variable 1 -0.34  -0.06  
Performance Variable 2 0.00  -0.41  
Performance Variable 3 1.00  0.88  






 Agency Structure 0.04 0.27 -0.75 .07 
Board of Directors 0.83  -1.35  
Compensation Incentives-Family 0.76  -1.46  
Compensation Incentives-Nonfamily 0.13  -2.04  
Monitoring Variable 1 -1.10  1.19  
Monitoring Variable 2 -0.70  0.44  
Monitoring Variable 3 -0.60  -0.12  
Monitoring Variable 4 -1.80  4.85  
Monitoring Variable 5 -0.81  1.10  
 Stewardship Structure -0.64 0.27 -0.10 .04 
Information Interaction Variable 1 -0.82  -0.10  
Information Interaction Variable 3 -0.89  0.03  
Social Interaction Variable 1 -0.50  -0.29  
Social Interaction Variable 2 -1.41  2.98  






 Agent Behavior 0.75 0.27 0.61 .00 
Productivity (reversed) Variable 1 0.64  -0.29  
Productivity (reversed) Variable 2 0.91  0.37  
Productivity (reversed) Variable 3 0.55  -0.45  
 Steward Behavior -1.03 0.27 1.37 .01 
Organizational Commitment Variable 1 -0.88  -0.14  
Organizational Commitment Variable 2 -1.07  1.08  
Organizational Commitment Variable 3 -0.96  0.52  












Figure 3.1 continued 



















































With considerations for each statistic and a visual inspection of the distribution, I 
concluded that stewardship structure, agent behavior, and steward behavior violate the 
assumption of normality, and therefore transformation is necessary. Based on the appearance and 
skewness of the distribution, the appropriate transformation to normality for stewardship 
structure is a reflection and logarithm, for agent behavior is a square root, and for steward 
behavior is a reflection and logarithm (Cohen et al., 2003). Accordingly, Figure 3.2 presents the 
statistics, histogram, and normal probability plots for the transformed variables. These 






Figure 3.2: Normality Statistics and Plots for Transformed Variables 
 
Skewness Std Error Kurtosis 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
significance value 
 Stewardship Structure -0.08 0.27 -0.70 0.20 
 Agent Behavior 0.23 0.27 -0.29 0.04 































Linearity and Homoscedasticity. The relationship between two continuous variables 
should be linear to be appropriate for correlation analysis. Linearity can be assessed by a 
scatterplot, where variables appear to be clustered in a straight line as opposed to curvilinear. 
Homoscedasticity assumes that the variability in scores for one variable should be similar at all 
values of the second variable. Homoscedasticity can also be assessed by a scatterplot, where 
variables appear to follow a cigar-shaped pattern. Figure 3.3 presents the scatterplots for the 
variables in my research model. Based on these scatterplots, I conclude that the data do not 






















































Bias Tests  
Due to the lower than desired response rate, I performed three checks for potential 
nonresponse bias and also assessed sample representativeness. Due to the use of primary survey 
data, I also tested for common methods bias. A description of these bias tests is provided next. 
Nonresponse Bias. Research shows that late respondents are more similar to 
nonrespondents than they are to early respondents (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975). As such, I 
divided respondents into groups categorized as early or late respondents, based on the average 
number of days to respond. As a second check, I split the data by grouping those who responded 
to the first mailing versus those who responded to the second mailing. And, as an additional 
check, I compared my sample data with the data I collected that could not be used in the analysis 
(i.e., if the respondent was part of a triad versus not a part of a triad). This third test was to 
ensure the final sample for data analysis was similar to the complete sample of respondents. If no 
significant differences in the means of the research variables are found on these splits, the 
assumption is supported that nonresponse bias is not a major problem in this study. Table 3.9, 





Table 3.9: Leader Survey Nonresponse Bias Statistics 
 
Early vs. Late 1st vs. 2nd Mailing Triad vs. Non-Triad 
 
Early Late t df p 1st 2nd t df p Triad Non t df p 
Firm Performance 4.82 4.79 0.10 75 0.92 4.96 4.53 1.86 75 0.07 4.81 4.79 -0.17 165 0.87 
Agent Behavior 2.54 2.50 0.30 75 0.77 2.53 2.52 0.02 75 0.98 2.53 2.58 0.64 165 0.52 
Steward Behavior 5.61 5.78 -0.67 75 0.51 5.54 5.90 -1.44 75 0.15 5.67 5.70 0.22 165 0.82 
Board of Directors 0.25 0.46 -1.78 75 0.06 0.40 0.15 2.33 75 0.01* 0.31 0.21 -1.48 165 0.14 
Compensation 
Incentives-Family 0.32 0.33 -0.11 75 0.91 0.28 0.41 -1.13 75 0.26 0.32 0.34 0.27 165 0.79 
Compensation 
Incentives-Nonfamily 0.42 0.58 -1.37 75 0.18 0.48 0.48 -0.18 75 0.86 0.47 0.48 0.13 165 0.90 
Industry 4.76 4.75 0.10 75 0.99 4.92 4.44 1.07 75 0.29 4.75 4.81 0.21 165 0.84 
Firm Age 32.60 43.96 -1.71 75 0.09 35.06 38.15 -0.47 75 0.64 36.14 30.68 -1.20 165 0.23 
Firm Size 1.23 1.53 -1.83 75 0.08 1.41 1.17 1.70 75 0.09 1.32 1.13 -1.81 165 0.07 
Leader Education 3.94 3.63 1.14 75 0.26 3.96 3.63 1.22 75 0.23 3.84 3.88 0.19 165 0.85 
Leader Gender 0.75 0.88 -1.32 75 0.19 0.80 0.78 0.23 75 0.82 0.79 0.76 -0.56 165 0.58 
Leader Age 54.90 55.18 -0.11 75 0.91 56.42 52.33 1.71 75 0.09 54.99 55.60 0.36 165 0.72 
Leader Tenure 21.64 25.25 -1.11 75 0.27 23.40 21.59 0.57 75 0.57 22.77 20.19 -1.28 165 0.20 





For the 77 leader surveys in my sample, the average days to respond was 23.17, with 53 
early responders and 24 late responders. There were no significant differences in the variable 
means using this grouping. Split differently, there were 50 respondents who returned the first 
survey mailed; the remaining 27 respondents required a second survey before responding. There 
was only one variable, the presence of a board of directors, that was significantly different 
between these groups. Forty percent of responders to the first survey indicated their firms had a 
board of directors, whereas only fifteen percent of responders to the second survey indicated 
their firms had a board of directors. However, based on the early versus late statistic on this 
variable, coupled with this variable being a relatively small part of the agency governance 
structure index, there was little cause for concern. The third bias check includes comparing 
means on the surveys I used in this research versus the surveys I did not. I received a total of 167 
leader surveys, including 77 that are part of a survey triad, and 90 that are not part of a triad (i.e., 





Table 3.10: Family Employee Survey Nonresponse Bias Statistics 
 
Early vs. Late 1st vs. 2nd Mailing Triad vs. Non-Triad 
 
Early Late t df p 1st 2nd t df p Triad Non t df p 
Monitoring 5.91 5.65 1.04 75 0.03 5.86 5.77 0.37 75 0.71 5.82 5.47 1.68 113 0.10 
Stewardship Structure 0.31 0.26 0.95 75 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.53 75 0.60 0.29 0.31 -0.41 113 0.68 
Gender 0.56 0.48 0.65 75 0.52 0.57 0.48 0.70 75 0.48 0.53 0.44 0.86 113 0.39 
Age  41.87 39.21 0.76 75 0.45 41.48 40.23 0.37 75 0.71 40.97 46.74 -1.90 113 0.06 
Education 3.63 3.64 -0.03 75 0.98 3.51 3.81 -1.19 75 0.24 3.63 3.29 1.66 113 0.10 
Tenure 11.97 12.15 -0.07 75 0.94 12.95 10.68 0.94 75 0.35 12.03 16.03 -1.73 113 0.09 




For the 77 family employees in my sample, the average days to respond was 24.45, with 
51 early responders and 26 late responders. Split differently, there were 46 respondents who 
returned the first survey mailed; the remaining 31 respondents required a second survey before 
responding. I received a total of 115 family employee surveys, of which 77 were used in this 
sample of matched triads and 38 were not used. As shown, there were no significant differences 






Table 3.11: Nonfamily Employee Survey Nonresponse Bias Statistics 
 
Early vs. Late 1st vs. 2nd Mailing Triad vs. Non-Triad 
 
Early Late t df p 1st 2nd t df p Triad Non t df p 
Monitoring 5.36 5.24 0.34 75 0.74 5.23 5.46 -0.709 75 0.48 5.32 5.09 0.84 112 0.40 
Stewardship Structure 0.35 0.38 -0.60 75 0.55 0.37 0.35 0.510 75 0.61 0.36 0.41 -1.09 112 0.28 
Gender 0.36 0.48 -0.92 75 0.36 0.37 0.43 -0.624 75 0.54 0.40 0.38 0.18 112 0.86 
Age  46.20 39.95 2.09 75 0.04* 45.09 13.47 0.509 75 0.61 44.41 46.59 -0.80 112 0.43 
Education 3.13 3.00 0.50 75 0.62 3.29 2.81 2.101 75 0.04* 3.08 3.09 0.05 112 0.96 
Tenure 10.15 9.20 0.39 75 0.70 11.11 8.16 1.349 75 0.18 14.35 9.88 -1.93 112 0.06 






For the 77 nonfamily employees in my sample, the average days to respond was 21.70, 
with 55 early responders and 22 late responders. For this grouping, there was a significant 
difference in the average age of early versus late responders. The early responders were older, 
46.20 years on average versus 39.95 years for the late responders. Split differently, there were 45 
respondents who returned the first survey mailed; the remaining 32 respondents required a 
second survey before responding. There was a significant difference in the education level of 
those requiring a follow-up survey: the group responding to the first survey request had, on 
average, received some college education, whereas the group responding to the second survey 
were high school educated, on average. Neither of the significant differences on age and 
education were seen across the other splits, are approaching non-significance (i.e., p=0.04), and 
are not an integral part of this investigation. I received a total of 114 nonfamily employee 
surveys, of which 77 were used in this sample of matched triads and 37 were not used. There 
were no significant differences found across the variables with this split. Taken together, I 
conclude that nonresponse bias is not a major issue in this research. 
Representativeness. Due to the small sample size, I conducted a check to ensure my 
research sample is representative of the population. In line with the literature (e.g., Eddleston, 
Otondo, and Kellermanns, 2008), I compared characteristics from my sample to those of four 
other samples: (1) sample of 673 US family firms from the 1997 National Family Business 
Survey (Winter, Danes, Koh, Fredericks, and Paul, 2004); (2) sample of 1464 US family firms 
from Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino (2003); (3) sample of 315 US family firms from Davis, Allen, 
and Hayes (2010); and (4) sample of 1035 US family firms from Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, 
and Pieper (2012). Respectively, these studies represent a national database, the largest sample 




reported in my review of the family firm literature grounded to stewardship theory, and the 
largest sample reported in my review of the family firm literature utilizing both agency and 
stewardship theory perspectives. Similar to my approach, each of these empirical studies 
sampled family firms in the US. Additionally, none of the authors of these empirical studies 
overlap, thereby assuming their samples do not overlap. Each of these aforementioned studies 
captured different variables, so complete comparisons could not be made. Table 3.12 presents a 
comparison table of key leader and firm characteristics across the family firm samples.  
 
 
Table 3.12: Representativeness across Samples 
 
1997 Database Agency Stewardship Both Current Study 
 
Winter et al 
(2004) 
Schulze et al 
(2003) 
Davis et al 
(2010) 
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Firm Characteristics 
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      Retail 0.21 
  
0.15 0.27 
 Services 0.41 
  
0.19 0.26 





















a Education Code: 1=high school; 2=some college; 3=college graduate; 4=postgraduate 
b Gender = percent male 
c Tenure Code: 1 = 1-2 years; 2 = 3-6 years; 3 = 7-10 years; 4 = 11-15 years; 5 = >15 years 
d # of Employees Code: 1 = 1-5 employees; 2 = 6-10 employees; 3 = 11-25 employees; 4 = 26-50 employees; 5 = >50 employees 





As shown, the leader characteristics in my sample are similar to those from other 
samples: the average age and tenure of the firm leaders in my sample is slightly greater, 
education levels are slightly lower, and are comprised of a greater percentage of males. The firm 
level characteristics are also similar: the average age of the firms in my sample is between the 
two samples of comparison, there are slightly fewer total employees but more family employees, 
and the industry and generational characteristics follow similar patterns and percentages. As 
such, I conclude that my sample is representative of US family firms in general.  
Common Method Bias. The variance attributable to the method rather than the measures, 
referred to as common method bias, is often a concern in survey research (Fiske, 1982; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff, 2003). There are techniques for controlling common 
method bias, both from a procedural perspective (i.e., survey design) and from a statistical 
perspective. To alleviate potential concerns, I took the following procedural prescriptions: (1) I 
collected the predictor and criterion variables from different sources (e.g., leader, family 
employee, nonfamily employee); (2) I protected respondent anonymity and confidentiality; (3) I 
stated in bold lettering on top of each survey that there are no right or wrong answers thus hoping 
to prevent dishonest but socially desirable answers; and (4) I used previously accepted and 
validated scales with carefully constructed questions that were not ambiguous, vague, or double-
barreled (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Because the predictor and criterion variables were obtained from different sources, 
coupled with the aforementioned survey design prescriptions, according to Podsakoff et al., 
2003: 897), “additional statistical remedies could be used but in our view are probably 
unnecessary in these instances.” However, as a precaution, I performed a Harman’s single-factor 




firm survey research studies (e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Kellermanns, Eddleston, 
Barnett, and Pearson, 2008; Memili et al., 2010). This test entails entering all the items of the 
model’s variables in a factor analysis to determine the number of factors that emerge and the 
amount of variance explained. If no dominant factor emerges from this statistical test, coupled 
with the procedural prescriptions taken, I can conclude that common method bias does not 
appear to be a problem. I entered all the items of my model’s variables in a factor analysis. Eight 
factors emerged (i.e., represented by 3 control variables, 2 independent variables, 2 mediators, 
and 1 dependent variable) accounting for 72.57% of the variance, with the first factor explaining 
20.29%. Accordingly, I conclude that common method bias does not present an issue in my 
research. 
Conclusion 
 An account of the methodology used to test the research model and hypotheses was 
provided in this chapter. A general overview was provided first, followed by a specific 
description of the survey instrument and approach, sample, and measures. The data analysis 
section followed, with a description of the statistical analyses used to test the research model, 
preliminary analysis, diagnostics tests, and necessary tests of biases. The next chapter presents 








CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Chapter 3 presented the methodology employed in this study and the results from 
preliminary data analysis. This chapter presents the results from testing the hypothesized 
relationships in my research model and from additional post hoc tests. It first provides 
descriptive statistics and correlations, followed by the results of the hypotheses tests, and then 
concludes with post hoc results within agency and stewardship theory, across theories, and from 
the integration of theories. An integrated discussion of these results is found in Chapter 5. 
Correlation Results 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between the variables in my study are 
provided in Table 4.1. On average, my sample of 77 family firms have been in business for 36.14 
years and employ 63.73 employees (natural logarithm used to correct for skewness, mean = 
1.32). Firms in the retail industry represent 27% of the sample, 26% are in the services industry, 
and the remaining firms are in other industries (i.e., manufacturing, construction, transportation). 
Agency structure is an index that captures the level of monitoring and control mechanisms 
present in the family firm. From low levels of agency structures to high levels of agency 
structures, the index values range from -5.03 to 4.94 with the average being 0.09. Stewardship 
structure captures the level of interaction from a communication and social perspective. The 
transformed values of stewardship structure range from 0.00, representing low levels of 
stewardship structures, to 0.69, representing high levels of stewardship structures, with an 
average value of 0.35. The average value for agent behavior is 1.46, measured by reverse coding 
productivity and transformed for skewness, with higher values representing greater levels of 
agent behavior. The average value for steward behavior is 0.33, measured by the level of 




score, the higher the level of steward behavior. The average level of firm performance, measured 
on a seven point scale, is 4.81, with higher scores representing higher levels of performance.  
As shown in the correlation matrix, of the control variables (i.e., firm age, size, industry), 
the family firm’s age is significantly correlated with the most variables: size, agent behavior, and 
firm performance. As expected, agency structure is negatively and significantly correlated with 
agent behavior, and stewardship structure is positively and significantly correlated with steward 
behavior. Both agency and stewardship structures are also significantly correlated with firm 
performance in the direction expected. However, neither agent behavior nor steward behavior is 
significantly correlated with firm performance. The strongest correlation is between agent 
behavior and steward behavior, indicated by a significant and positive relationship. 
As described, some of the variables in my study are correlated; however, the highest 
variance inflation factor statistic estimated in conjunction with each hierarchical regression 
model was 2.34. The most extreme condition index statistic was 23.12. Both are below the 
threshold indicating multicollinearity, therefore alleviating that concern in my study (Hair, 







Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
  
Mean Std Dev 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 




    
  
2 Size  1.32  0.59 
 
 0.31**  1.00 
 
    
  
3 Retail  0.27  0.45 
 
 0.14  0.09  1.00     
  
4 Services  0.26  0.44 
 
-0.17 -0.08 -0.36***  1.00     
 
5 Agency Structure  0.09  2.37 
 
-0.03  0.29** -0.07  0.02  1.00    
 
6 Stewardship Structure 0.35 0.16 
 
-0.05  0.05  0.15  0.03 -0.13  1.00    
7 Agent Behavior 1.46 0.30 
 
 0.24*  0.22† -0.16 -0.05 -0.24*  0.17  1.00   
8 Steward Behavior 0.33 0.19 
 
 0.05  0.13 -0.24*  0.18 -0.19  0.22*  0.69***  1.00  
9 Firm Performance  4.81 0.97 
 
-0.25*  0.19† -0.06  0.21†  0.23*  0.25* -0.18 -0.09  1.00 
n = 77 matched triads  
*** correlation is significant at the 0.001 level 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
* correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 





Within and Across Theory 
My hypotheses were tested via hierarchical regression analysis with six models, and 
results are provided in Table 4.2. In Model 1, firm performance was regressed on the control 
variables, with two significant relationships. The age of the firm was significantly and negatively 
related to performance, indicating that the older the firm, the lower the performance (B = -0.01, 
p≤.01). The size of the firm, measured by the natural logarithm of the number of employees, was 
significantly and positively related to performance (B = 0.50, p≤.01), indicating that the greater 
the number of employees, the greater the performance. The industry variables (i.e., retail, 
services, and other industries as the omitted referent) were not significant with firm performance.  
Model 2 through Model 6 follow the steps in the Baron and Kenny (1986) test for 
mediation. Each step is necessary to provide support for a mediational model. In the first step, 
shown as Model 2, I regressed the dependent variable on the independent variables: I built from 
Model 1 by adding agency structure and stewardship structure to the equation. Firm age and size 
remained significant, industry remained not significant. Agency structure was approaching 
significance with firm performance (B = 0.08, p≤.10), and stewardship structure was significant 
with firm performance (B = 1.50, p≤.05). This model accounts for 18.4% of the variance in firm 
performance as indicated by the adjusted R² value, which is the statistic typically reported for 
smaller sample sizes. This explains 6.0% more of the variance in firm performance beyond just 
the control variables. 
The next step, shown in Models 3 and 4, involved regressing the mediators on the 
independent variables. In Model 3, agent behavior was regressed on agency structure and 




p≤.05) and retail industry (B = -0.20 p≤.01) were significant. Agency structure was negatively 
and highly significant with agent behavior (B = -0.04, p≤.01), thus supporting Hypothesis 1. 
Stewardship structure was positively and moderately significant with agency behavior (B = 0.33, 
p≤.10), thus marginally supporting Hypothesis 6a. The variables in Model 3 explain 19.4% of the 
variance in agent behavior. In Model 4, steward behavior was regressed on agency structure and 
stewardship structure. The same control variables, firm size and retail industry, were significant 
with steward behavior as they were on agent behavior (B = 0.07, p≤.10 and B = -0.12, p≤.05, 
respectively). Stewardship structure exhibited a positive and significant relationship with steward 
behavior (B = 0.27, p≤.05), thus supporting Hypothesis 3. Agency structure exhibited a negative 
and significant relationship with steward behavior (B = -0.02, p≤.05), thus supporting Hypothesis 
5a. The variables in Model 4 explain 13.6% of the variance in steward behavior. 
The third step involved regressing the dependent variable on the mediators, as shown in 
Model 5. As was the case in Model 1 and Model 2, the firm’s age and size remained significant 
with firm performance (B = -0.01, p≤.05 and B = .55, p≤.01, respectively). Agent behavior was 
negatively but not significantly associated with firm performance. Although the direction of the 
relationship was as hypothesized, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Steward behavior was also 
negatively but not significantly associated with firm performance indicating no support for 
Hypothesis 4. This model explains 13.4% of the variance in firm performance, which represents 
an increase of only 1.0% over the model with just the control variables. 
Model 6 depicts the final step, where I simultaneously regressed the dependent variable 
on both the independent variables and mediators. With all variables entered, firm age and size 
remained significant with firm performance (B = -0.01, p≤.05 and B = 0.46, p≤.05, respectively). 




structure was not significant with firm performance. Neither agent behavior nor steward behavior 
were significant with firm performance. This model explains 20.5% of the variance in family 
firm performance. Although not formally hypothesized, the results of these steps indicate that 




Table 4.2: Regression Results – Within and Across Theory 




Behavior Performance Performance 
 







































































































       
Adj. R²  0.124  0.184  0.194  0.136  0.134  0.205 
F statistic  3.70**  3.86**  4.04**  2.99**  2.96**  3.45** 
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses) 
n = 77 matched triads 
*** significant at the 0.001 level 
** significant at the 0.01 level 
* significant at the 0.05 level 





To test the moderation hypotheses of the effect of kinship status across theories, data 
were analyzed by splitting apart the triads into dyad relationships: 77 dyads comprised of the 
family firm leader matched with the family employee within the same firm, and 77 dyads 
comprised of the family firm leader matched with the nonfamily employee within the same firm. 
Accordingly, the aggregated responses of family and nonfamily employees were not used as they 
were for the triad analysis; rather, the responses from the family employees were separate from 
the nonfamily employee responses. Correlation results for these dyad subsets are found in Table 
4.3; regression results for this analysis are found in Table 4.4. 
The relationships of interest in this dyad analysis are those with agency structure and 
stewardship structure, as those are the variables measured with employee responses. As indicated 
in the correlation matrix, family responses are depicted below the diagonal and nonfamily 
responses are above the diagonal. For family and nonfamily employees, agency structure is 
significantly and positively correlated with firm size and firm performance. Additionally, agency 
structure and stewardship structure are significantly and negatively correlated for family; agency 
structure and agent behavior are significantly and negatively correlated for nonfamily. For family 
employees, stewardship structure is significantly and positively correlated with steward behavior. 
For nonfamily employees, stewardship structure is significantly and positively correlated with 





Table 4.3: Bivariate Correlations for Dyad Subsets 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Age    0.31**  0.14 -0.17  0.05 -0.08  0.24*  0.05 *0.25* 
2 Size  0.31**   0.09 -0.08  0.30**  0.13  0.22†  0.13  0.19† 
3 Retail  0.14  0.09   -0.36** -0.06  0.22† -0.16 -0.24* -0.06 
4 Services -0.17 -0.08 -0.36***   -0.02  0.05 -0.05  0.18  0.21† 
5 Agency Structure -0.05  0.31** -0.07  0.05   -0.10 -0.20† -0.14  0.21† 
6 Stewardship Structure  0.01 -0.05 -0.00 -0.01 -0.24*    0.15  0.11  0.32** 
7 Agent Behavior  0.24*  0.22† -0.16 -0.05 -0.18  0.11    0.69*** -0.18 
8 Steward Behavior  0.05  0.13 -0.24*  0.18 -0.18  0.22*  0.69***   -0.09 
9 Firm Performance -0.25*  0.19† -0.06  0.21†  0.24*  0.04 -0.18 -0.09   
n = 77 leader-family dyads below the diagonal; 77 leader-nonfamily dyads above the diagonal 
*** correlation is significant at the 0.001 level 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
* correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 





Table 4.4: Regression Results – Kinship Status Effects Across Theories 
 Steward Behavior 
 






























































   






      
Adj. R²  0.098  0.073 
 
 0.084  0.114 
F statistic  2.65*  2.20† 
 
 2.39*  2.95* 
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses) 
n = 77 matched dyads of leader-family; 77 matched dyads of leader-nonfamily 
*** significant at the 0.001 level 
** significant at the 0.01 level 
* significant at the 0.05 level 




Using the same control variables as in the matched triad regression models, steward 
behavior of family and nonfamily employees was regressed on agency structure. As shown, 
agency structure is negatively and significantly related to the steward behavior of both family 
employees (B = -0.02, p≤.05) and nonfamily employees (B = -0.02, p≤.10). The slope of the line 
is slightly steeper for family than nonfamily (i.e., -.022 versus -.017 when rounded to three 
decimals), and significance of the relationship is stronger for family employees than for 
nonfamily employees. At high levels of agency structure, family employees exhibit less steward 
behavior. This finding supports Hypothesis 5b.  
I plotted the effects of kinship status on the relationship of agency structure and steward 
behavior. These lines were plotted using the regression equations and predicted values at one 
standard deviation above and one standard deviation below the mean. For example, using the 
results from Table 4.4, family steward behavior = 0.23 – 0.02 agency structure. The mean of 
agency structure is 0.09, and the standard deviation is 2.37. The predicted value for steward 
behavior at one standard deviation above the mean (2.46) is 0.18, and at one standard deviation 
below the mean (-2.28) is 0.28. A line was then drawn between these two points. Likewise, the 
regression line was also plotted for nonfamily employees’ predicted steward behavior. Figure 4.1 




















Agent behavior of family and nonfamily employees was then regressed on stewardship 
structure. As indicated, stewardship structure is not a significant predictor of agent behavior for 
family employees (B = 0.19, n.s.), but is positively and moderately significant with agent 
behavior of nonfamily employees (B = 0.29, p≤.10). Although this supports kinship status as a 
moderator in the stewardship structure–agent behavior relationship, it runs counter to the 
hypothesized relationships. Thus, Hypothesis 6b is partially supported. Using the same method 
described above, I plotted the effects of kinship status on the relationship between stewardship 













































I hypothesize that is it possible, and even beneficial, for organizations to have both 
agency and stewardship structures in place simultaneously. To test the integration of theories, I 
conducted a one-way between-groups analysis of variance to explore the impact of structural 
combinations on firm performance levels
3
. Family firms were divided into four groups based on 
their level of agency and stewardship structures. I coded each family firm as having either a high 
or low level of agency structure using the sample mean score of 0.09 as the dividing point. I also 
                                                 
3
 I also conducted OLS regression to analyze the integration of theories. I created an interaction term by multiplying 
agency structure and stewardship structure. I then regressed the control variables, agency structure, stewardship 
structure, and the interaction term on firm performance. The interaction term was significant (B = .71, p≤.01), 
indicating that the integration of structures is positively associated with firm performance. However, the impact of 
varying structural combinations cannot be interpreted with this analysis. Accordingly, a between-groups ANOVA 






























coded each family firm as having either a high or low level of stewardship structure using the 
sample mean of 0.35 as the dividing point. I then coded each organization into one of four 
groups: (1) Monitor Structure: high agency structure and low stewardship structure; (2) Trust But 
Monitor Structure: high agency structure and high stewardship structure; (3) Undetermined 
Structure: low agency structure and low stewardship structure; and (4) Trust Structure: low 
agency structure and high stewardship structure.  
Results from the between-groups ANOVA indicate a statistically significant difference in 
firm performance for the four groups: F(3, 73) = 3.88, p=.01. The effect size, calculated using eta 
squared, was 0.14 and is therefore considered large (Cohen, 1988). Table 4.5 presents the mean 
firm performance levels of each group. As indicated by the highlighted cell in Table 4.5, the 
highest performance level occurs when family firms have Trust But Monitor Structures (i.e., high 
levels of both agency and stewardship structures), followed by Trust Structures, Undetermined 
Structures, and with Monitor Structures resulting in the lowest firm performance level. The 
Tukey HSD test indicates that the mean performance level for family firms with the Trust But 
Monitor Structure (M=5.43, SD=0.85) is significantly different and higher than the performance 
of firms with the Monitor Structure (M=4.50, SD=1.10) and the Undetermined Structure 
(M=4.57, SD=1.00), but is not significantly different from firm performance of firms with the 
Trust Structure (M=4.79, SD=0.68). These results partially support Hypothesis 7; as predicted, 









I also performed a similar analysis using OLS hierarchical regression so that I could 
control for additional factors that may be influencing firm performance levels. As with my 
previous analysis, I controlled for firm age, firm size, and industry. I created dummy variables 
for each combination of structures and used the Trust But Monitor Structure as the referent 
category. Regression results are shown in Table 4.6 and can be interpreted as follows. Generally, 
the performance level of firms with Trust But Monitor Structures is 4.96. For those with Trust 
Structures, firm performance is 0.50 less; Undetermined Structures, 0.54 less; Monitor 
Structures, 0.82 less. Each variable is significant at the .10 level. The global F test shows the 
model is significant at the .01 level. Using the adjusted R² statistic, the model explains 17.9% of 
the variance in firm performance. The addition of the control variables did not change the results 
from the between-groups ANOVA. 
  
Table 4.5: Firm Performance Levels by Governance Structure Integration 
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Table 4.6: Regression Results – Integrating Theory 
 Performance Performance 
 




























Monitor Structure (High Agency and Low Stewardship) 
-0.82** 
(0.30) 
Trust Structure (Low Agency and High Stewardship) 
-0.50† 
(0.30) 
Undetermined Structure (Low Agency and Low Stewardship) 
-0.54† 
(0.31) 
   
Adj. R²  0.124  0.179 
F statistic  3.70**  3.36** 
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses) 
n = 77 matched triads 
*** significant at the 0.001 level 
** significant at the 0.01 level 
* significant at the 0.05 level 





To summarize the analyses, my hypothesized relationships and results are presented in 
Table 4.7. Of the nine hypotheses in my research, five were fully supported, two were partially 
supported, and two were not supported. I conducted a deeper investigation into the relationships 
through multiple post hoc examinations. The remainder of this chapter provides a description of 









Table 4.7: Hypothesized Relationships and Results 
Within Agency Theory 
 
H1 Agency structure is negatively associated with agent behavior. Supported 
H2 Agent behavior is negatively associated with firm performance. Not supported 
Within Stewardship Theory 
 
H3 Stewardship structure is positively associated with steward behavior. Supported 
H4 Steward behavior is positively associated with firm performance. Not supported 
Across Theory 
 
H5a Agency structure is negatively associated with steward behavior. Supported 
H5b Kinship status moderates the relationship between agency structure and 
steward behavior, such that the negative relationship strengthens for family 
employees and weakens for nonfamily employees. 
Supported 
H6a Stewardship structure is positively associated with agent behavior. Supported 
H6b Kinship status moderates the relationship between stewardship structure and 
agent behavior, such that the positive relationship strengthens for family 
employees and weakens for nonfamily employees. 
Partially Supported 
(moderation supported, but 






The interaction of agency and stewardship structures results in varying levels 
of firm performance. Specifically, the Trust But Monitor Structure results in 
the highest level of firm performance, followed by the Monitor Structure, 
then Trust Structure, with the Undetermined Structure resulting in the lowest 




(interaction supported, but 
performance levels in a 





Post Hoc Tests and Results 
Within and Across Theory – Post Hoc 
Both agency and stewardship theory predict enhanced firm performance when structures 
are in place to curb agent behavior or empower steward behavior. My research model 
incorporated predictions within and across agency and stewardship theories by examining the 
relationship between structure and behavior and the relationship between behavior and 
performance. As reported, my results supported the hypothesized relationships between structure 
and behavior within and across agency and stewardship theories. However, my empirical 
examination did not find significant main effects between agent behavior and firm performance 
or steward behavior and firm performance. Accordingly, I conducted post hoc tests of potential 
moderators that may be influencing these relationships to provide possible explanations for the 
nonfindings. I focused on two individual level characteristics, human capital and position within 
the family firm, for these post hoc moderation tests.  
I selected human capital, operationalized as the level of formal education completed
4
, and 
position within the organization
5
 as potential moderators in the relationship between behavior 
and performance. I suspect human capital may moderate the relationship because employee 
behavior may only translate to increased firm performance if the employee is highly capable. I 
suspect that position may moderate the relationship because employee behavior may only 
translate to increased firm performance if the employee is in a position to lead and make changes 
within the organization. 
                                                 
4
 Educational level was self-reported by family and nonfamily employees. Respondents who indicated their 
education level was less than a high school diploma, a high-school diploma, or some college/associates degree were 
coded 0; those who indicated a bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, or terminal degree were coded 1. 
5
 Position in the family firm was self-reported by family and nonfamily employees. Managers and below (i.e., office 
managers, secretaries, dental hygienists) were coded 0; Directors and above (i.e., Director of Human Resources, 




For the moderation post hoc tests, rather than capturing the leader’s perception of agent 
and steward behavior within the firm, I captured agent behavior and steward behavior from both 
family and nonfamily employees. This provides two benefits; it alleviates common methods bias 
because the independent and dependent variables are captured from different sources, and I can 
analyze results by family versus nonfamily employees.  
The moderation tests were conducted via OLS hierarchical regression. Results of human 
capital as a potential moderator in the relationship between behavior and performance are 
presented in Table 4.8. The moderating effects were tested in 3 models for leader-family dyads 
and leader-nonfamily dyads. In Model 1, I regressed the same control variables used in previous 
analysis (i.e., firm age, firm size, and industry) on firm performance, finding age and size to be 
significant. Model 2 incorporates the independent variables, agent behavior, steward behavior, 
and human capital; none have a significant relationship with firm performance for family or 
nonfamily. Model 3 includes the interaction terms of human capital and agent behavior and 
human capital and steward behavior. Neither of the interaction terms are significant for family 
employees; however, the interaction of human capital and steward behavior was significant for 
nonfamily employees (B = 2.67; p≤.05). The results indicate that human capital is indeed a 
moderator in the relationship between a nonfamily employee’s steward behavior and firm 
performance. The interaction plot is presented in Figure 4.3. As depicted, the steward behavior of 




Table 4.8: Post Hoc Results – Human Capital Moderation 
























































































Independent Variables    
  
 






























Interactions   
  
 


















        
Adj. R²  0.124  0.134  0.123   0.124  0.104  0.137 
F statistic  3.70**  2.68*  2.19*   3.70**  2.26*  2.35* 
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses) 
n = 77 matched dyads of leader-family; 77 matched dyads of leader-nonfamily 
*** significant at the 0.001 level 
** significant at the 0.01 level 
* significant at the 0.05 level 







Results of organizational position as a potential moderator in the relationship between 
behavior and performance are presented in Table 4.9. Similar to the human capital analysis, the 
moderating effects were tested in 3 models for leader-family dyads and leader-nonfamily dyads. 
In Model 1, I regressed the control variables on firm performance, finding family firm age and 
size to be significant. Model 2 incorporates the independent variables, agent behavior, steward 
behavior, and position; none have a significant relationship with firm performance for family or 
nonfamily. Model 3 includes the interaction terms of position and agent behavior and position 
and steward behavior. Neither of the interaction terms are significant for nonfamily employees; 
however, the interaction of position and steward behavior was significant for family employees 































relationship between a family employee’s steward behavior and firm performance. The 
interaction plot is presented in Figure 4.4. As depicted, the steward behavior of family members 
who are directors and executives positively impacts firm performance. 
Taken together, results of these post hoc tests reveal that there are moderators in the 
relationship between individual behavior and firm performance. For nonfamily employees, the 
level of human capital influences the relationship between steward behavior and firm 
performance. For family employees, the position within the organization influences the 
relationship between steward behavior and firm performance. Neither human capital nor 
organizational position was found to be a moderator in the relationship between agent behavior 




Table 4.9: Post Hoc Results – Position Moderation 

























































































































Interactions   
  
 


















        
Adj. R²  0.124  0.126  0.177   0.124  0.103  0.111 
F statistic  3.70**  2.57*  2.82**   3.70**  2.25*  2.04* 
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses) 
n = 77 matched dyads of leader-family; 77 matched dyads of leader-nonfamily 
*** significant at the 0.001 level 
** significant at the 0.01 level 
* significant at the 0.05 level 


















Kinship Status – Post Hoc 
My research model examined, and results supported, kinship status as a moderator in the 
relationship between structure and behavior across theories. Although not formally hypothesized, 
I tested the effects of kinship status on within theory predictions as a post hoc test. Regression 
results for this analysis are found in Table 4.10. As shown, agency structure is negatively and 
significantly associated with agent behavior for both family (B = -0.03, p≤.05) and nonfamily (B 
= -0.04, p≤.01) employees. Stewardship structure is positively and significantly associated with 
the steward behavior of family employees (B = 0.23, p≤.05), but has no significant effect on the 






























Table 4.10: Post Hoc Results – Kinship Status Effects Within Theories 
 Steward Behavior 
 






































































      
Adj. R²  0.084  0.051 
 
 0.132  0.162 
F statistic  2.40*  1.81 
 
 3.32**  3.93** 
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses) 
n = 77 matched dyads of leader-family; 77 matched dyads of leader-nonfamily 
*** significant at the 0.001 level 
** significant at the 0.01 level 
* significant at the 0.05 level 




























































Integrating Theory – Post Hoc 
 My research examined the performance levels of family firms exhibiting varying levels 
of both agency and stewardship structures. Each of the 77 family firms in my sample were 
grouped into one of four categories based on their levels of agency and stewardship structures: 
Monitor Structure (high agency and low stewardship), Trust But Monitor Structure (high agency 
and high stewardship), Undetermined Structure (low agency and low stewardship), and Trust 
Structure (low agency and high stewardship). Results supported my assertion that these groups 
have significantly different performance levels. As a post hoc examination, I explored leader and 
firm level characteristics within these groups to see if any patterns, other than their governance 
structures, emerged in their configurations. Table 4.11 presents the means of these characteristics 
among the four groups. 
 The leader characteristics examined were gender (displayed as the percentage male), age, 
(displayed in years), education (1=less than high school, 2=high school, 3=some college, 
4=bachelor’s degree, 5=master’s degree, 6=terminal degree), tenure (displayed in years working 
in the family firm), and founder (displayed as the percentage of leaders who are also the firm’s 
founder). The firm characteristics examined were the number of family and nonfamily 
employees, generations of ownership concentration (1=one generation, 2=two generations, 3= 
three or more generations), generation currently working in the firm (1=one generation, 2=two 
generations, 3= three or more generations), whether the family firm employs top management 
who are not family members, has a business plan, and has a succession plan (displayed as the 


















     
Gender 0.78 0.78 0.73 0.89 n.s. 
Age 58.74 54.63 54.38 52.47 n.s. 
Education 3.72 4.22 3.73 3.74 n.s. 
Tenure 27.78 23.17 22.45 18.00 n.s. 
Founder 0.44 0.67 0.59 0.53 n.s. 
Firm Characteristics 
     
Family Employees 3.29 5.72 2.55 6.38 n.s. 
Nonfamily Employees 108.96 94.89 18.50 25.87 n.s. 
Generations Owning 1.61 1.56 1.41 1.37 n.s. 
Generations Working 2.00 1.89 1.55 2.11 p≤.05 
Nonfamily TMT 0.72 0.72 0.32 0.42 p≤.05 
Business Plan 0.89 0.89 0.50 0.74 p≤.01 
Succession Plan 0.67 0.72 0.36 0.37 p≤.05 
Firm Performance 4.50 5.43 4.57 4.79 p≤.01 




 Based on a means comparison, there are no significant differences in leader 
characteristics among the four groups. Although, it is of interest to note that firms with Trust But 
Monitor Structures have a higher percentage of leaders who are also the founders of the family 
firm. The means comparison is more revealing when examining firm level characteristics. The 
Monitor Structures and Trust But Monitor Structures are the most similar in firm level 
characteristics. Based on my sample, 72% of firms with these structures have top management 




place. These firms both have high agency structures but differ in their level of stewardship 
structure and in their level of firm performance; the Trust But Monitor Structure has a higher 
level of stewardship structure and a significantly higher level of firm performance. This finding 
implies that the high level of stewardship structure could be driving the firm’s performance since 
all other characteristics are equal. This implication is further supported in that firms with 
Monitor Structures and Undetermined Structures have the lowest performance levels and also 
low levels of stewardship structures. The Undetermined Structures have the lowest levels of 
generations working, the lowest percentage of nonfamily top management team members, and 
the lowest levels of having a business plan and succession plan in place. These family firms do 
not appear to be structured in any discernable way. The firms with Trust Structures have the 
highest level of generations currently working in the family business. This finding implies that 
the more generations of family involved, the more prevalent a culture of high stewardship and 
low agency structure. Also of notable interest, the structures with high levels of agency structure, 
regardless of the level of stewardship structure, have the greatest number of nonfamily members; 
this implies that as the firm grows with nonfamily, monitoring mechanisms prescribed by agency 
theory are deemed necessary. Conversely, the structures with high levels of stewardship 
structure, regardless of the level of agency structure, have the greatest number of family 
members; this implies that the presence of family members within the firm creates an 
environment where stewardship prescriptions can prevail. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter presented the results of my data analyses for testing the relationships in my 




predictions within, across, and in the integration of agency and stewardship theories. Chapter 5 




CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a discussion of my research findings in six major sections. The first 
section provides an overview of this study and reiterates the research questions guiding my 
dissertation. The second section offers a discussion of the findings from the tests of the 
hypothesized relationships in my research model. The third section describes the contributions 
this study makes to the literature, theory, and practice. The fourth and fifth sections address 
limitations and offer suggestions for future research. The last section concludes the dissertation 
by providing answers to the aforementioned research questions. 
Overview 
Family firms are the most prevalent and enduring organizational type, but organizational 
research centering on family firms pales in comparison (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006; Goel et 
al., 2012; Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009). However, there has been a recent influx of 
research in this context, with most scholarly investigations focused on the predictors of 
performance of these firms. Accordingly, family firm governance has been a dominant topic of 
interest (Goel et al., 2012). Agency theory and stewardship theory both address governance and 
firm performance, and therefore have served as theoretical lenses within these investigations.  
However, both agency and stewardship theories offer opposing assumptions and 
predictions for firm performance (Chrisman et al., 2007; Cruz et al., 2010; Wasserman, 2006; 
Tosi et al., 2003), and therefore have sparked an on-going debate in the family firm literature 
regarding their applicability (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009). Agency theory assumes an 
economic model of man; agent behavior is based on self-interest and may conflict with the 
principal’s interest. Governance structures that control and monitor agents are prescribed to 




Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Stewardship theory assumes a humanistic model of man; 
steward behavior is based on serving others and therefore will align with the principal’s interest. 
Governance structures that empower and encourage stewards are prescribed to facilitate the 
continued alignment of interests (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Investigations 
reveal that either theory can be applicable in the unique context of family firms, thereby creating 
ambiguous and confounding predictions about behavior and performance.  
As such, the purpose of my dissertation was to gain insights into the appropriateness and 
predictive ability of each theory on family firm behavior and performance. To do so, the first 
objective was to review, synthesize, and expose limitations in the literature grounded to agency 
theory and/or stewardship theory within family firms. The second objective was to empirically 
investigate predictions developed from insights gleaned from the review and synthesis. The 
following research questions guided this project: 
1. Are the tenets, prescriptions, and related performance outcomes of (a) agency theory 
and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family firms? 
 
2. Can the opposing prescriptions of agency theory and stewardship theory be integrated 
within family firms to explain firm performance? 
 
3. Does the family firm context (a) expand and/or (b) impose boundary conditions on 
agency and stewardship theories?  
 
Research Findings 
Extant studies investigate whether agency or stewardship theory is more applicable 
within family firms. Instead, my research investigates whether agency and stewardship theory 
can be integrated to explain family firm performance. My research model intertwined structural 
and behavioral components of agency and stewardship perspectives, making predictions within 






 The first four hypotheses in my research model examined within theory relationships. 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 investigated within agency theory predictions. According to agency theory, 
principals implement governance structures to curb the assumed opportunistic behavior of 
managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). These agency structures include 
mechanisms that control and monitor behavior, such as the presence of a board of directors, 
incentive compensation plans, and formal monitoring activities (Chrisman et al., 2007; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989). Theory suggests these structures align the goals 
of the manager with the principal, and in turn firm performance in enhanced. Hypothesis 1 
predicted that agency structures reduce opportunistic agent behavior; my results supported this 
prediction. Hypothesis 2 linked reduced agent behavior to increased firm performance; my 
results did not support this prediction.  
Hypothesis 3 and 4 investigated within stewardship theory predictions. According to 
stewardship theory, principals implement governance structures to empower and encourage the 
assumed steward behavior of managers (Davis et al., 1997). These stewardship structures are 
depicted by work environments that are participatory and collectivistic (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991). Theory suggests these structures empower a steward’s other-interested and pro-
organizational behavior, thus leading to increased firm performance (Davis et al., 1997). 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that stewardship structures enhance steward behavior; my results 
supported this prediction. Hypothesis 4 linked increased steward behavior to increased firm 
performance; my results did not support this prediction. 
Relationship between structure and behavior. As described, the relationships between 




predictions. As a deeper investigation into the relationship between structure and behavior, I 
examined results by kinship status. Results show that agency structures curb the agent behavior 
of both family and nonfamily employees alike. However, results also show that stewardship 
structures increase the steward behavior of only family employees; it has no impact on the 
steward behavior of nonfamily employees. Taken together, these findings suggest that both 
agency and stewardship governance structures serve their intended purpose on the behavior of 
employees within family firms, but more so for family than nonfamily employees. 
Relationship between behavior and performance. As described, the relationships between 
behavior and firm performance were not supported for either of the within theory predictions. 
This finding implies that the agent and steward behaviors of employees within the family firm do 
not have a significant impact on the performance of the family firm. Within stewardship theory, 
my post hoc analysis revealed a reason for these nonfindings may be due to a contingency in the 
relationship between steward behavior and performance. Human capital and position with the 
organization both moderated the relationship between steward behavior and firm performance. 
Results indicate that the steward behavior of nonfamily employees with higher levels of 
human capital is beneficial to the performance of the firm. This finding could mean that the level 
of human capital impacts the nonfamily employee’s level of understanding about the goals of the 
principal. Steward behavior theoretically leads to increased performance because the steward 
manager is other-serving and therefore works toward the principal’s best interest (Davis et al., 
1997). A highly educated nonfamily manager would work toward the principal’s interest thereby 
enhancing firm performance; however, a less educated nonfamily manager may not comprehend 
the goals of the principal, thereby not behaving in a way that would lead to increased 




between steward behavior and firm performance. This finding implies that family members 
already have an understanding of the family firm’s goals because of the familial status, 
regardless of the level of human capital. 
Results also indicate that the steward behavior of family members in higher ranking 
positions has a beneficial impact on firm performance. This perhaps indicates that as more 
family members serve in prominent roles within the family business, the more a stewardship 
culture can emerge. This reduces the cost and stress associated with potentially unnecessary 
monitoring mechanisms and would allow for family members to be empowered to behave in the 
best interest of the firm. In turn, increased firm performance could lead to increased benefits for 
the family such as the ability to pass a successful firm to future generations. This supports the 
contention of Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2009) that a stewardship perspective prevails when 
the family is embedded in the business. It is also aligns with the stewardship research of 
Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007) that demonstrates that family involvement can have a positive 
influence on family firm outcomes and help it succeed through the generations.  
Within agency theory, my post hoc analysis did not find support for moderators in the 
relationship between agent behavior and performance. The lack of findings in the main effect 
and in the moderation analysis could potentially be due to impression management, defined as 
“those behaviors individuals employ to protect their self-images, influence the way they are 
perceived by significant others, or both” (Wayne and Liden, 1995: 232). I measured agent 
behavior, operationalized as unproductive behavior, in aggregate from the perception of the firm 
leader. It is possible that employees may be behaving in an unproductive manner but are able to 
conceal this behavior from the leader, thereby influencing the leader’s perception and survey 




employee. This measure also produced nonsignificant findings, indicating the possibility that 
employees rated their behavior as more productive than actual behavior in order to enhance my 
perception of them. 
Relationship between structure and performance. Results also indicate a positive and 
significant relationship between structure and firm performance, for both agency and stewardship 
structures. These findings, coupled with the lack of findings between behavior and performance, 
reveal that agency and stewardship governance structures have a beneficial and direct effect on 
both employee behavior and firm performance, rather than having an indirect effect on firm 
performance through behavior. Additionally, these within theory results indicate that stewardship 
structures and steward behavior have a greater impact on firm performance than do agency 
structures and reduced agent behavior; this is especially the case when nonfamily members have 
high levels of human capital and when family members are in high ranking positions within the 
organization. 
Across Theory 
 The next four hypotheses in my research model examined across theory relationships: 
Hypothesis 5a and 6a examined direct effects across theories; Hypothesis 5b and 6b examined 
kinship status as a moderator in these across theory relationships. Theory suggests that when the 
parties in the principal-manager relationship make different choices in agency or stewardship, 
negative consequences can arise (Davis et al., 1997). If a principal imposes an agency structure 
on a steward manager, the manager may feel betrayed and offended by the use of these control 
and monitoring mechanisms and may decrease the level of steward behavior (Pieper et al., 2008). 
If a principal imposes a stewardship structure on an agent manager, the manager is afforded the 




monitored in this type of environment (Davis et al., 1997). Both of the across theory predictions 
were supported in my research: Hypothesis 5a predicted reduced steward behavior in the 
presence of agency structures; Hypothesis 6a predicted increased agent behavior in the presence 
of stewardship structures. These findings demonstrate the negative behavioral consequences of 
mismatched choices in the principal-manager relationship (Davis et al., 1997).  
 This research also examined kinship status as a moderator in the across theory 
relationships, suggesting that the relationships are different for family and nonfamily employees 
of the family firm. In broad terms, I suggested the negative across-theory consequences between 
structure and behavior are worse for family employees than for nonfamily employees. More 
specifically, in the agent structure-steward behavior relationship, my arguments were based on 
fairness perceptions (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006; Evans and Davis, 2005). If agency 
structures are implemented and applied consistently across the organization, I predicted that 
family employees would have lower levels of steward behavior than nonfamily employees. To 
elaborate, research suggests that family employees often have a sense of entitlement. When they 
are treated the same as nonfamily employees, they perceive unfairness by losing advantages (i.e., 
perks, higher compensation, no monitoring) thought to be entitled to them. Conversely, 
nonfamily employees perceive fairness when the governance structure is not biased in favor of 
family employees. These fairness perceptions impact the level of pro-organizational steward 
behavior. Hypothesis 5b formally stated this kinship status prediction, and my results supported 
this hypothesis. Agency structure is negatively and significantly related to the steward behavior 
for both family and nonfamily employees. However, at high levels of agency structure, family 




 I also predicted stronger negative consequences for family employees than for nonfamily 
employees in the steward structure-agent behavior relationship. The literature suggests that 
family employees are often territorial and protective of their family’s firm. When family 
members feel that nonfamily members are infringing on their territory, by way of social 
interaction, information exchange, and collectivistic cultures typified by stewardship structures, 
their level of counterproductive behavior may increase (Rantanen and Jussila, 2011). For 
nonfamily employees, who are part of the business system but not the family system, 
stewardship structures can facilitate feelings of interconnectedness and membership (Mustakallio 
et al., 2002). In turn, increased productive behavior (i.e., decreased agent behavior) may result 
because nonfamily members feel as if they are part of the family system and want to work 
toward the best interest of the family business. Hypothesis 6b formally stated this kinship status 
prediction in the relationship between stewardship structure and agent behavior. Results show 
support for kinship status as a moderator, but results run counter to the hypothesized predictions. 
The relationship between stewardship structure and agent behavior for family employees is not 
statistically significant, but it is for nonfamily employees. At low levels of stewardship structure, 
both family and nonfamily employees exhibit the same level of agent behavior. However, at high 
levels of stewardship structure, nonfamily employees exhibit higher levels of agent behavior than 
family employees.  
 These results indicate that agency structure has negative consequences on the steward 
behavior of both family and nonfamily employees, but more so for family employees. 
Stewardship structure increases the agent behavior for nonfamily, but has no significant effect on 




demonstrate that family firm governance structures have differing behavioral effects on family 
and nonfamily employees of the business.  
Integrating Theory 
 Relationship between structural integration and performance. The final hypothesis of my 
research model examined the integration of agency and stewardship structures on the 
performance of family firms. I suggested that family firms can have characteristics of both 
agency and stewardship governance structures; firms can have high levels of both, low levels of 
both, or combinations of high and low agency/stewardship structures. In Hypothesis 7, I 
predicted that when firms exhibit high levels of both agency and stewardship structures, the 
negative behavioral consequences across theory would be negated, thereby increasing firm 
performance. Indeed, this finding is supported in my sample of family firms. The firm 
performance level for the group of family firms categorized as having Trust But Monitor 
Structures is significantly higher than any other combinations of structures. This finding implies 
that family firms will have beneficial performance differentials when they have structures in 
place both control and monitor agent behavior while simultaneously empowering steward 
behavior. 
 A deeper investigation of the firms with Trust But Monitor structures reveals patterns in 
firm level characteristics. On average, these family firms not only have high levels of both 
agency and stewardship structures, but they have high levels of nonfamily on their top 
management teams, and have business plans and succession plans in place. This pattern suggests 
these family firms are more professionalized than the other groups in this analysis. Conversely, 
firms with Undetermined Structures have the lowest levels of these characteristics among the 




performance than agency structures; high levels of stewardship structures are found in the Trust 
But Monitor Structure and the Trust Structure, both of which have the higher levels of firm 
performance than the Monitor or Undetermined Structure. 
 Relationship between structural integration and behavior. My research shows a positive 
impact on family firm performance when governance structures are integrated. However, a closer 
examination of the impact on behavior with consideration of kinship status was made. I 
examined the effects of kinship status on within theory predictions and on across theory 
predictions. Findings support behavioral differences among family and nonfamily employees 
that can be attributed to family firm governance structures. When integrating agency and 
stewardship structures, my research offers additional implications with regard to behavior. 
Agency structure curbs agent behavior for both family and nonfamily employees, but it also 
decreases steward behavior for both family and nonfamily employees. Stewardship structure 
increases steward behavior for family employees but has no effect on the steward behavior of 
nonfamily employees. Stewardship structure also increases agent behavior of nonfamily 
employees, but has no effect on the agent behavior of family members.  
 This implies that agency structures are beneficial for family firms because they curb 
opportunistic agent behavior; however, these structures have negative consequences on steward 
behavior. Stewardship structures are beneficial for family firms because they increase steward 
behavior of family employees; however, these structures are harmful because they increase the 
agent behavior of nonfamily employees. This implies that agency structures are necessary, but 
that stewardship structures may only be beneficial when the family firm employs a large number 




This can also shed light on the relationship between the principal and managers within 
family firms. When the principal chooses agency, family and nonfamily employees behave 
similarly: they might be agents because their agent behavior is curbed; they might be stewards 
because they reduce their steward behavior because they are offended by the use of controlling 
and monitoring mechanisms. When the principal chooses stewardship, family and nonfamily 
employees behave differently: family employees are likely stewards because their steward 
behavior increases without their level of agent behavior increasing; nonfamily employees are 
likely agents because their agent behavior increases without their level of steward behavior 
increasing. Taken together, this implies that family employees are stewards and nonfamily 
employees are agents in the principal-manager relationship within family firms. 
Contributions 
This research makes contributions to the family firm literature, theory, and practice. For 
family firm literature, this research answered a call for examinations of agency and stewardship 
theories side by side in the context of family firms (Chrisman et al., 2007). The extant literature 
adopts an either-or perspective and neglects considerations of whether both agency and 
stewardship environments can coexist. My research integrated agency theory and stewardship 
theory to capture the essence of family firm structure, behavior, and performance. In doing so, it 
demonstrated that agency and stewardship structures individually can increase firm performance, 
but that the combination of structures is more beneficial for family firm performance. 
Furthermore, the combination of structures can negate the negative behavioral 
consequences within the family firm. Behavior is an important but neglected element of both 
agency and stewardship theories, and is therefore captured in this research. Because of the 




considerations of kinship status. My research demonstrated that the structure of the family firm 
impacts the behavior for family and nonfamily employees differently. This implies that 
respondents are a key concern in family firm research; results may be misleading if studies 
continue to mix survey responses from family and nonfamily employees. Additionally, this 
research makes an empirical contribution to the family firm literature. To my knowledge, it is the 
first study to capture and analyze data from matched triads comprised of the leader, a family 
employee, and a nonfamily employee of the family firm.  
For theory, this research provides a theoretical integration, suggests an important 
boundary condition, and offers a theoretical extension. This integrated study is the first to capture 
the essence of both theories in tandem. Agency and stewardship theories address the principal-
manager relationship from a structural, behavioral, and performance outcome perspective (Davis 
et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, I incorporate both agency and stewardship structure 
and behavior in the same research model. I empirically capture the choice of agency and 
stewardship structure and behavior by obtaining and analyzing survey responses from both sides 
of the principal-manager relationship. Because of this integrated approach, performance 
outcomes predicted within each theory and across theories can be empirically investigated. 
Second, this research imposes a boundary condition around the proposed behavioral and 
performance outcomes of theory when context is taken into consideration. It empirically 
investigates whether outcomes of agency and stewardship prescriptions hold equivocally 
between family and nonfamily employees of the family business. Third, this research offers an 
extension to agency and stewardship theories. The original theories neglect to consider how the 
leader of the organization can influence the behavioral choice of managers. This study 




can influence the manager’s choice of agent or steward behavior. This extension provides a new 
area of investigation for agency and stewardship research, particularly as it relates to leaders 
influencing matched behavioral choices to obtain the desired performance outcomes.  
For practice, this research sheds light on the ambiguity surrounding the value of 
governance structures for family firms. Agency and stewardship structures have a direct impact 
on family firm performance, but also can have varying behavioral effects on family and 
nonfamily employees of the business. Accordingly, family firm leaders need to pay particular 
attention when implementing these structures. Achieving desirable firm performance levels and 
desirable behavioral outcomes from family and nonfamily employees alike is a balancing act 
between implementing the appropriate levels and types of governance structures.  
Limitations 
My research is not without limitations. Both agency and stewardship theories consider 
the principal-manager relationship, and as such, empirical tests require input from each side of 
the relationship. Accordingly, there was a trade-off between remaining true to the theoretical 
core and sample size. I chose theory and therefore was only able to capture and analyze data 
from 77 matched triads. I found support for my hypotheses linking governance structures to 
individual level agent and steward behavior and was able to demonstrate that kinship status alters 
these relationships. I was also able to find support linking governance structures, individually 
and in combination, to firm performance. However, I did not find support for the hypothesized 
relationships between individual level behaviors and firm level performance. Statistical power 
may be a limitation and a reason for the non-findings. Accordingly, I conducted a power analysis 
using G*Power 3.1 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, and Lang, 2009) by inputting a sample 




moderator), an effect size of 0.30 and an alpha level of 0.05. This power analysis generated result 
of 0.97, which is considered an acceptable level of power (Cohen, 1988). Although the small 
sample size doesn’t appear to present a power issue, it may however limit the generalizability of 
my findings.  
Although generalizability may be considered a limitation of my study, I demonstrated the 
applicability of my research findings in three analyses. These included an analysis of response 
rates, an analysis of nonresponse bias, and an analysis of sample representativeness. As reported, 
my overall response rate was 9.5%, but due to constraining my data analytics to matched 
organizational triads, the response rate was reduced to 3.8%. However, these response rates are 
similar to those in family firm research. For example, Schulze et al (2003) reported an 
organizational response rate of 10.3% (i.e., 3860 responses from 37304 firms), but dropped 2396 
firms for a final response rate of 3.92%; Chrisman et al (2007) reported an 18% organizational 
response rate (i.e., 5779 responses from 32156 firms), but dropped 5571 firms for a final 
response rate of less than 1%. As such, my response rate statistic has been deemed acceptable in 
prior family firm studies. However, I took additional steps to determine if my respondents are 
representative of the population. I compared early responders with late responders, finding no 
significant differences in responses across the study’s variables. Research suggests that late 
responders are similar to nonresponders; therefore, finding that my late responders were similar 
to my early responders implies that my sample, as a whole, is similar to the nonresponding 
population (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975). Furthermore, I compared characteristics of the family 
firms in my sample with (1) primary data I collected from family firms not used in my analysis 
(i.e., not part of an organizational triad), (2) secondary data from a national database (e.g., 




and/or stewardship theory (e.g., Davis et al., 2010; Sciascia et al., 2012; Schulze et al., 2003). 
These comparisons found my sample to be similar to other family firm samples. Taken together, 
these analyses demonstrate the representativeness of my sample, and thus the applicability of my 
research findings to the general population of family firms.  
Another limitation is that my study was cross-sectional in nature and, therefore, I cannot 
infer causality from my findings. For the most part, my hypothesized relationships were 
supported; yet, it may be possible that the causal relationship between structure and behavior is 
reversed. Meaning, the actual behavior of the employees within the firm could trigger the 
principal to implement matched governance structures, rather than the structure impacting the 
behavior. Furthermore, structures and behaviors within family firms may not be static; a cross-
sectional study would not capture the possible dynamic quality of these relationships. A 
longitudinal approach is thus warranted. 
By obtaining data from multiple respondents per firm, I utilized a stronger design than 
commonly found in the family firm literature. Although having multiple respondents per firm 
makes an empirical contribution to the family firm literature, only capturing responses from one 
family and one nonfamily employee may be a limitation in my study. The perceptions of 
governance structures of the responding family employee and nonfamily employee may not be 
representative of the perceptions of all the employees of the family firm. In order to link 
structure, behavior, and performance together within family firms, a much larger sample of 
respondents per firm would be ideal. Future research could improve on my study’s design and 
capture responses from more employees of the same family firm. This would allow for more 
generalizable comparisons between family and nonfamily employees, rather than making one to 





Aside from future research recommendations that would address my methodological 
concerns (i.e., larger sample size, longitudinal approach, additional respondents per firm), there 
are additional research possibilities. Specifically, future research could investigate the integration 
of agency and stewardship theories on different outcome variables. For example, my study 
utilized a subjective measure of family firm performance. If the firm leader responding to the 
survey was satisfied with the firm’s overall performance level, he or she may have rated their 
performance as high. However, the performance level may not be objectively high. Accordingly, 
I encourage research that can determine if the relationships hold when using objective measures 
of performance.  
Furthermore, it may also be appropriate to consider social or psychological outcomes 
rather than firm performance outcomes. I did not find significant main effects in the relationships 
between behavior and firm performance. Future research could examine the effects of steward 
behavior and agent behavior on outcomes other than firm performance. Given that agency theory 
is rooted in economics and stewardship theory is rooted in sociology and psychology, future 
research should consider more than just economic outcomes. For example, socioemotional 
wealth generation is suggested to be important to family firms (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). It 
may be of interest to determine how agency and stewardship structures and behaviors are linked 
to this noneconomic outcome. Other potential outcomes could include process variables, such as 
cohesion or conflict within the family firm. In turn, these noneconomic variables could then 
perhaps be linked to the performance of the family firm. Accordingly, these noneconomic 




Future research could also investigate additional moderators in the relationship between 
behavior and performance. My post hoc analyses considered individual level characteristics, 
finding both human capital and position within the organization to be moderators, contingent on 
kinship status. Alternatively, firm level moderators, such as having a clear and compelling 
organizational vision, may be potential areas for investigation. A clear vision describes the future 
direction of the firm and provides the reasoning behind the leader and employees’ journey. It 
should reflect the firm’s ideals, foster commitment and meaning in work, and enhance 
motivation and change in employees (Fry, 2003; Fry and Cohen, 2009). I suspect this is a 
potential moderator in the relationship between behavior and firm performance because 
employees would need to have an understanding of the organization’s direction in order to 
behave in the intended way. For example, it is assumed that stewards act in the best interest of 
the firm, but if the best interest of the firm is unknown or misinterpreted, behavior may not have 
the intended consequences. To elaborate, if the firm’s vision is to perform at the highest level 
possible but employees think the vision is to increase the family’s reputation, behavior would not 
align with increased firm performance. Accordingly, investigating moderators in the relationship 
between individual behavior and family firm performance could help provide explanations for 
my nonfindings and reveal additional contingencies within this unique context. 
My research demonstrates that kinship status considerations can impact relationships 
within the family firm. Most family firm research neglects to consider the nonfamily employee. 
In my sample, which is shown to be representative of samples in similar family firm empirical 
studies, 94% of employees (59 of 63 employees, on average) are not family members. Extant 
research makes inferences about the behavior and performance of family firms; however, these 




encourage researchers to investigate nonfamily employees, and specifically how they may differ 
from family employees. Differences in perceptions, behaviors, and individual level performance 
all provide fruitful avenues for investigation. 
To my knowledge, this research is the first to investigate the integration of agency and 
stewardship perspectives on the behavior within and performance of family firms. Organizations 
were grouped into four categories based on their level of agency and stewardship structures. A 
post hoc analysis found that organizations clustered within each category are similar on 
characteristics other than just their governance structures, such as the presence of a succession 
plan, business plan, and nonfamily top managers, just to name a few. An in depth qualitative case 
study of organizations within each of these quadrants would help us uncover behavioral and 
performance patterns among different variables not studied in my research. A configurations 
approach to the examination of family firm performance would be a fascinating direction for 
future research.  
Future research could also consider incorporating additional theoretical lenses to help 
explain the behavioral and performance outcomes of the integration of agency and stewardship 
structures. For example, the relationship between structural integration and behavior can 
incorporate a social exchange theory or balance theory lens. Social exchange theory describes a 
series of dyadic exchanges with behavior being contingent on the actions of another (Blau, 1964; 
Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Homans, 1961). This lens could be appropriate in examining 
governance structure enactment and the resulting employee behavior from a dynamic, rather than 
static, perspective. Derived from social psychology, balance theory describes triadic 
relationships by its focus on an individual’s perception of his or her relationship with a second 




balanced state exists when relationships among the entities are harmonious (Peterson, 2006). 
Balance theory could prove useful in examinations of relationships between family and 
nonfamily employees and their attitude towards the structure of the family firm. 
The relationship between structural integration and firm performance could incorporate a 
resource-related theoretical lens such as resource orchestration (e.g., Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, and 
Gilbert, 2011). Resource orchestration blends the resource based view (Barney, 1991) and 
dynamic capabilities perspective (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuan, 1997) 
by examining managerial actions and the bundling of resources to predict firm level performance 
and competitive advantages (Sirmon et al., 2011). The principal enacting certain configurations 
of stewardship and agency structures depicts managerial action and resource bundling, and 
would therefore allow the resource orchestration framework to serve as an appropriate theoretical 
lens to investigating firm performance implications. 
In summary, my dissertation research investigates agency and stewardship theory within 
family firms and provides a foundation for future research that can further explore their 
integration. As described, potential areas include improving upon the methodology employed in 
this study, such as taking a longitudinal or in-depth qualitative approach. Future research can 
investigate different outcome variables including objective measures of firm performance, 
process outcomes, or individual level organizational behavior outcomes. Additional 
contingencies in the hypothesized relationships, such as organizational vision or leadership 
variables, could provide more insight into family firm performance. Continuing to investigate 
differences between family and nonfamily perceptions and behaviors also provides promise. 
Structural integration can also be examined through a configurations approach or even with the 




future research integrating agency and stewardship perspectives within a family firm context can 
take. 
Conclusion 
My dissertation investigated the agency versus stewardship theory debate within a family 
firm context. Through both an exhaustive review and synthesis of the family firm literature and 
an empirical test using primary data gathered from family firm leaders, family employees, and 
nonfamily employees, I can sufficiently answer the research questions guiding my dissertation. 
My first research question asked, ‘Are the tenets, prescriptions, and related performance 
outcomes of (a) agency theory and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family firms?’ My 
review of the family firm literature grounded in agency and/or stewardship theories, coupled 
with the results from my empirical study, allows me to answer ‘yes’ to both parts of this 
question. Agency theory and stewardship theory governance structures serve their intended 
purpose on the behavior within and performance of family firms: agency structures curb 
opportunistic agent behavior and increase firm performance; stewardship structures enhance 
steward behavior and increase firm performance. 
My second research question asked, ‘Can the opposing prescriptions of agency theory 
and stewardship theory be integrated within family firms to explain firm performance?’ My 
research revealed that considerations for agency and stewardship perspectives have been 
neglected in the family firm literature. To address this gap, my empirical study tested 
assumptions regarding the integration of theory, finding support for enhanced performance 
differentials between combinations of structures. Family firms adopting high levels of both 
agency and stewardship structures have significantly higher performance results. Accordingly, 




My third research question asked, ‘Does the family firm context (a) expand and/or (b) 
impose boundary conditions on agency and stewardship theories? The family firm literature 
shows that agency and stewardship theories have been expanded in this context. Research shows 
that not only do agency problems exist in family firms, which is counter to the work of early 
agency theorists, but there are agency problems unique to this context. Research also supports 
stewardship theory’s expansion into the family firm context, with studies demonstrating that 
family firms are an ideal context for stewardship to thrive. My empirical investigation offers 
another step toward further expansion of these theories. My research shows that agency and 
stewardship structures and behaviors can coexist in family firms. This is different from the 
existing literature that depicts agency and stewardship theories at polar extremes. My research 
demonstrates that these theories in opposition can expand into each other, thus narrowing the 
distance between both sides of the debate. Additionally, my research suggests that the leader of 
the family business can alter the behavior of the employees and performance levels of the firm 
by making changes to the governance structures. Shifting the primary focus to the role of the 
family firm leader, rather than the structure or behavior, could allow for additional theoretical 
expansions. Accordingly, I can answer ‘yes’ to the question of whether the family firm context 
expands agency theory and stewardship theories. 
My research considers the role of kinship status as a factor that places a boundary 
condition on predictions grounded in agency and stewardship theories. My empirical 
investigation demonstrates that family and nonfamily employees of the family firm behave 
differently as a result of agency and stewardship structures. Agency structures reduce agent and 
steward behavior for both family and nonfamily employees. Stewardship structures increase 




employees. Stewardship structures also increase steward behavior for family employees, but 
have no effect on the steward behavior of nonfamily employees. Furthermore, my post hoc 
examination demonstrated that human capital and position within the organization influence the 
relationship between steward behavior and firm performance differently for family and 
nonfamily employees. Employing highly educated nonfamily employees and high ranking family 
employees is beneficial to the performance of the family firm. Kinship status, which is a unique 
construct within family firms, is found to be a contingency in my hypothesized relationships. 
Accordingly, I can answer ‘yes’ to the question of whether the family firm context imposes a 
boundary condition on agency and stewardship theories. 
In conclusion, my dissertation investigated the theoretical and empirical debate of agency 
theory versus stewardship theory in the context of family firms, revealing that the distance 
between these opposing theoretical perspectives can be narrowed. My research shows that both 
theories, separately and in combination, are applicable within family firms. Separately, agency 
and stewardships structures serve their within-theorized purpose on the behavior within and 
performance of family firms; however, consideration must be made to the differing effects of 
these structures on the behavior of family and nonfamily employees of the family firm. In 
combination, family firms with both agency and stewardship structures in place have superior 
performance. This research is a first step in integrating agency theory and stewardship theory to 
more accurately capture the essence of family firm structure, behavior, and performance. I 
encourage scholars to build from this foundation; this integration has the potential to provide 
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